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Abstract 
 
INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS AND THE DISCLOSURE OF IT CONTROL WEAKNESSES 
 
By Basil Hamdan, Ph.D. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011 
 
Major Director: Dr. Allen S. Lee Professor, Information Systems 
 
The current research is concerned with exploring the quality of information 
technology (IT) control over financial reporting systems as reported under Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. More specifically, this dissertation examines the 
association between organizational governance mechanisms and the occurrence and 
subsequent disclosure of IT control weaknesses. 
Despite the adverse impact of IT control weaknesses on internal control quality and 
financial reporting reliability, research on IT controls in general and IT control 
weaknesses in particular remains largely anecdotal with limited reliance on theory. The 
current work proposes and tests an integrated theoretical model of the antecedents of IT 
control weaknesses. The proposed model draws upon agency theory to provide a 
theoretical perspective of the occurrence of IT control weaknesses and upon corporate 
governance literature to solicit potential factors that influence the achievement of 
effective IT control over financial reporting. 
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Drawing upon agency theory, this research views the existence of IT control 
weaknesses as a manifestation of an agency problem caused by information asymmetry 
and lack of alignment between the overall organization represented by its board of 
directors as a principal and its information systems (IS) organization represented by the 
top IS team as an agent. Drawing on corporate governance literature, this dissertation 
proposes two categories of governance and contracting mechanisms that the board of 
directors can employ to reduce information asymmetry and align the interests of the top 
IS team with those of the firm thereby reducing the agency problem. These categories 
are: IT governance mechanisms and IT executive incentive alignment mechanisms.  
The IT governance mechanisms involve two elements: first, the IT background 
element which includes (a) the IT background of the board of directors as reflected by 
two of its main committees, namely the corporate governance committee and the audit 
committee and (b) the IT background of the top management team; second, the IT 
executive element as reflected in terms of the structural and the expert power of the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO). The IT executive incentive alignment mechanisms include 
two elements: (a) the CIO’s absolute compensation level and (b) the pay disparity 
between the CIO and other members of the top management team. A research model 
integrating these elements is developed and tested with empirical data. For testing the 
proposed model, this dissertation uses a sample of firms with IT control weaknesses and 
a control group of similar firms with no IT control weaknesses for the years 2005-2009.  
Empirical results provide support for five of the seven hypotheses put forth in this 
research. Regarding the IT governance mechanisms, study findings indicate that a lower 
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likelihood of disclosing IT-related control weaknesses is associated with having audit 
committee and corporate governance committee members with IT expertise. 
Furthermore, the study findings provide support for the contention that the goal 
congruence is contingent on the CIO’s power. To this end, the study finds that a lower 
likelihood of disclosing IT-related control weaknesses is associated with having CIOs 
with higher levels of structural and expert power.  
As for the incentive alignment mechanisms, empirical results provide support for the 
assertion that goal congruence is contingent on perceived pay equality between the CIO 
and other members of the top management team. The results indicate that the lower the 
pay disparity between IT executives and business executives in the top management 
team, the lower the likelihood of disclosing IT control weaknesses. 
The present study contributes to the current body of knowledge of literature in several 
ways. It is the first study to propose and test an integrated model of the antecedents of IT 
control weaknesses. The proposed model adds to the current literature by introducing 
agency theory as a theoretical basis of the antecedents of IT control weaknesses. 
Furthermore, this study adds to the current literature by introducing and providing 
empirical evidence linking the IT background of the corporate governance committee, the 
structural power and expert power of the CIO, and the CIO relative pay to the disclosure 
of IT control weaknesses over financial reporting. Lastly, this research contributes to 
practice by offering a much needed understanding for managers, directors, auditors, and 
regulators in their effort to improve the quality of IT control and the reliability of 
financial reporting. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
Providing reliable and timely financial and managerial information for decision 
makers, internal or external, has always been a top level priority for organizations, 
regulators, and society at large. To this end and in light of recent high-profile corporate 
scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, etc.), the United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 which aims, among other things, to improve corporate 
governance and internal control over financial reporting with the ultimate goal of 
ensuring the reliability of financial reporting. Of special interest to this research is 
Section 404 Management Assessment of Internal Controls. Per the requirements of this 
section, management of publicly traded companies are required to assess the design and 
operating effectiveness of their internal control over financial reporting and to report that 
assessment in their annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
namely in the 10-K forms. In addition, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board’s (PCAOB) Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 requires external auditors of all publicly 
traded companies to obtain an understanding of internal control over financial reporting, 
to test and evaluate the design and operating effectiveness of internal controls, and to 
opine on management’s report on the assessment of the effectiveness of internal control 
over financial reporting (PCAOB 2007).  
This dissertation is concerned with IT controls; an integral component of internal 
control over financial reporting (AICPA 2001; Smith 2004). With increasingly 
computerized business environments where key business processes including accounting 
2 
 
and financial reporting are entirely automated or largely dependent on IT functionality, it 
is of paramount importance that organizations design and implement IT controls to 
ensure the reliability of financial information and to safeguard the information systems 
that capture, process and generate them. To this end, a report by AMR Research, now a 
part of Gartner Inc., estimates that companies subject to SOX spent roughly six billion 
U.S. dollars a year in 2005 and 2006 to comply with the Act, 1.9 billion of which (32%) 
was spent on IT (Bradford and Brazel 2007). Despite these investments, many companies 
continue to report deficiencies in their internal control over financial reporting with 20% 
of these being related to IT control weaknesses (ITCW) (Grant et al. 2008).  
More specifically, this dissertation purports to obtain an understanding of the 
antecedents of ITCW and the ways in which these antecedents impact the weaknesses. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the main concepts 
in the research. Section 1.3 presents the research background and establishes the 
significance of the research. Section 1.4 presents the objectives of the research and the 
research questions. Finally, section 1.5 presents an outline of the remaining chapters of 
the dissertation. 
1.2. Basic Concepts Definitions 
This section offers definitions of the basic concepts in this dissertation. In order to 
avoid any ambiguity, the definitions presented herein draw heavily on auditing standards 
and other practitioner publications. 
Internal control (IC): is defined as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
3 
 
regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: (1) effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations” (COSO 1992). Although the COSO framework defines 
internal control in terms of achieving three objectives, Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which defines the scope of the current work, only pertains to internal control over 
financial reporting.  
Internal control over financial reporting (ICFR): is defined as  ‘‘a process 
designed by, or under the supervision of, the company’s principal executive and principal 
financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s 
board of directors, management, and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with GAAP” (PCAOB 2007). Internal control over 
financial reporting includes those policies and procedures that: 
(1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company;  
(2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit 
preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are 
being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors 
of the company; and 
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(3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of 
unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the company’s assets that could 
have a material effect on the financial statements (PCAOB 2007).  
Information technology control (ITC): consistent with the aforementioned 
definitions of internal control and internal control over financial reporting, this research 
defines IT control as a manual or automated process designed by, or under the 
supervision of, the company’s principal executive and principal IT officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s board of directors, 
management, and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
reliability of financial information and transactions and the continued proper operation of 
the information systems that capture, process and generate them.  
The IT control literature distinguishes between two classes of IT controls: 
application controls and general controls. As the name suggests, application controls 
relate to individual computer applications. More specifically, they relate to detecting and 
preventing the financial misstatement and financial fraud risks associated with using IT to 
initiate, record, process, and report transactions or other financial data. These controls 
help ensure that transactions are authorized, and completely and accurately recorded and 
processed. Application controls may be automated (e.g. automated reconciliation of 
subsystems, an application that updates accounts in the general ledger for sub-ledger 
activity, an application control that tests input and output accuracy, etc) or exclusively or 
primarily manual but dependent on IT functionality (e.g. a control that manually 
investigates items contained in a computer generated exception report). When application 
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controls are performed by people interacting with IT, they may be referred to as user 
controls (AICPA 2007, paragraphs 43-44; SEC 2006). General controls, on the other 
hand, are defined as policies and procedures that relate to many applications and support 
the effective functioning of application controls by helping to ensure the continued proper 
operation of information systems. General controls commonly include controls over data 
center and network operations, access security, IT management, system development, 
data security, change management, and business continuity planning (AICPA 2007, 
paragraph 45; Norman et al. 2009). 
While the current work recognizes the broad and multidimensional nature of IT 
quality, it focuses on IT control quality (ITCQ) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. As such, ITCQ is defined in terms of whether or not the firm has 
disclosed IT control weaknesses in the context of Section 404 reporting. To this end, 
firms with IT control weaknesses are viewed as having low IT control quality whereas 
firms with no IT-related control weaknesses are viewed as having high IT control quality.  
1.3. Research Background and Importance 
Given the pervasiveness of information systems in today’s business processes 
(Canada et al. 2009; Klamm and Watson 2009), auditing standards have explicitly 
emphasized that financial auditors test and evaluate the effectiveness of IT controls as 
they pertain to initiating, recording, processing, and reporting transactions or other 
financial data and that any significant weaknesses in IT controls are disclosed in the 
management’s report on the assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting (AICPA 2007). For example, AU Section (319), titled “Consideration 
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of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit,” dictates that in obtaining an 
understanding of internal control over financial reporting, the auditor should consider 
how an organization’s use of IT may affect internal controls relevant to the audit of 
financial statements and how IT risks could result in financial misstatements (AICPA 
2007).  
In the same vein, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 94, titled “The Effect of 
Information Technology on the Auditor’s Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit,” alerts external auditors that assessing control risk at 
maximum and relying only on substantive testing may not be effective for companies 
with intensively computerized financial reporting systems.  To this end, the standard 
advises financial auditors to use computer-related audit procedures when obtaining an 
understanding of clients’ internal controls during audit planning and to consider whether 
specialized skills, possessed by auditor’s staff or obtained through the use of IT audit 
specialists, are needed to determine the effect of IT on the audit and to understand, 
design, and perform tests of IT controls (AICPA 2001). 
Academic research has also drawn attention to the impact of computerization and IT 
control problems on financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting.  
Three streams of research can be recognized: (a) research on the impact of 
computerization on internal control quality and financial reporting reliability, (b) research 
on the impact of IT control weaknesses on internal control quality, financial reporting 
reliability, financial performance, and audit fees, and most recently (c) research on the 
characteristics of firms reporting IT control weaknesses. 
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Evidence in the extant literature on the effect of computerization on financial 
reporting indicates that computerized environments are more prone to internal control 
problems and financial misstatements than partially computerized or non-computerized 
environments (Bell et al. 1998; Canada et al. 2009; Hunton et al. 2004; Messier Jr et al. 
2004). Along the same lines, recent empirical evidence suggests that significant financial 
reporting implications may arise from relatively simple to extremely complex 
information systems (Curtis et al. 2009). For instance, there exists substantial evidence 
suggesting that enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems lead to heightened risks (IT, 
business, and overall control risks) and higher likelihood for financial misstatements, 
misclassifications, and defalcations (Hunton et al. 2004; Pfennig 1999; Sutton and 
Hampton 2003; Turner 1999). Less complex computerized systems, such as spreadsheets, 
have also been reported to cause internal control weaknesses and financial reporting 
problems (EUSPRIG).  
The reported positive association between the complexity of computerized 
information systems and the likelihood of internal control weaknesses and financial 
misstatements has important implications for management and auditors. Generally 
speaking, the more complex a computerized environment, the higher the overall control 
risks, the greater the complexity of assessing internal control risks (Hunton et al. 2004; 
O'Donnell et al. 2000), and the greater the complexity of audit procedures in terms of the 
nature, staffing, timing, and extent of the audit testing (Brazel and Agoglia 2007; Janvrin 
et al. 2009). 
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Furthermore, empirical evidence in the Sarbanes-Oxley regime points to a host of 
negative consequences associated with reporting IT control weaknesses. Specifically, 
findings from recent studies show that IT control weaknesses are associated with a larger 
number of internal control deficiencies (Bedard and Graham 2011; Canada et al. 2009; 
Grant et al. 2008), a larger number of financial misstatements (Grant et al. 2008; Klamm 
and Watson 2009), lower financial performance (Stoel and Muhanna 2009), and higher 
audit fees (Grant et al. 2008).  
Notwithstanding the evident impact of computerization in general and IT control 
weaknesses in particular on the effectiveness of internal control structure and the 
reliability of financial reporting, there is a paucity in theory-driven research on IT control 
quality in general and the antecedents of IT control weaknesses in particular (Li et al. 
2007a). This lack of understanding can be attributed to the lack of public disclosures on 
IT control weaknesses prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This is because 
publicly traded companies were only required to disclose internal controls deficiencies, 
including IT control weaknesses, if they changed auditors (Krishnan 2005; SEC 1988; 
Whisenant et al. 2003). However, this situation has changed with the passage of SOX and 
the issuance of subsequent auditing standards by the PCAOB, specifically AS2 and AS5. 
Today, companies subject to Sarbanes-Oxley compliance and the PCAOB auditing 
standards must disclose material weaknesses in internal control including IT control 
weaknesses in their annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (PCAOB 
2007).  
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This dissertation argues that the lack of understanding about the determinants of IT 
control weaknesses has significant implications for managers, auditors and regulators 
who have a vested interest in achieving effective internal control over financial reporting, 
reliable financial reporting and prudent corporate governance practices.  
Without a solid understanding of factors impacting the disclosure of IT control 
weaknesses, how they interact, and how they vary in terms of the magnitude and 
direction of their influence, the organizational endeavor to achieve effective IT control is 
likely to fail. For instance, such lack of understanding could lead organizations to direct 
their attention and much needed resources towards certain governance mechanisms while 
ignoring others that are more critical for achieving quality IT controls. Worse yet, 
organization could unconsciously put in place mechanisms that have conflicting 
influences on IT control quality. 
1.4. Research Objectives and Questions 
Evidence from the extant literature indicates that computerization increases the 
likelihood of internal control deficiencies and financial misstatements (Bell et al. 1998; 
Messier Jr et al. 2004). Furthermore, recent evidence on IT control quality suggests that 
IT control weaknesses are associated with a larger number of internal control deficiencies 
(Bedard and Graham 2011; Grant et al. 2008), a larger number of financial misstatements 
(Grant et al. 2008; Klamm and Watson 2009), lower financial performance (Stoel and 
Muhanna 2009), and higher audit fees (Canada et al. 2009; Grant et al. 2008). Combined, 
these pieces of evidence are indicative of the pervasive nature of information systems and 
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IT controls and their critical role in enabling or inhibiting effective internal control over 
financial reporting.  
However, to the best of my knowledge, there exists no single study that has 
investigated the determinants of IT control weaknesses. In fact, apart from Li et al.’s 
(2007a) study which examined the impact of internal and external governance on IT 
control quality, this dissertation knows of no other research that has investigated the 
determinants of IT control weaknesses. Their study, however, suffers from three major 
limitations: (a) lack of theoretical grounding, (b) failure to consider other factors, besides 
IT governance, that may impact IT control quality, and (c) use of data from only the first 
year of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 compliance. 
The current research purports to answer the following two questions: 
(1) What are the antecedents of IT control weaknesses as reported under Section 404 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002? 
(2) In what ways do the identified antecedents have an impact on IT control 
weaknesses? 
This dissertation sets out to answer the aforementioned questions by presenting and 
testing an integrated theoretical model of the antecedents of IT control weaknesses. The 
proposed model draws on agency theory to provide a theoretical perspective of the 
occurrence of IT control weaknesses and the IT governance literature and the executive 
compensation literature to solicit potential factors that enhance or impede the 
achievement of effective IT controls. To this end, two categories of governance 
mechanisms were identified as potentially impacting the disclosure of IT control 
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weaknesses. These categories are: IT governance mechanisms and IT executive incentive 
alignment mechanisms.  
The IT governance mechanisms involve two elements: first, the IT background 
element which includes (a) the IT background of the board of directors (BOD) as 
reflected by two of its main committees, namely the corporate governance committee and 
the audit committee and (b) the IT background of the top management team (TMT); 
second, the IT executive element as reflected in terms of the structural and the expert 
power of the Chief Information Officer (CIO). The IT executive incentive alignment 
mechanisms include two elements: (a) the CIO absolute compensation level and (b) the 
pay disparity between the CIO and other members of the TMT. These elements have 
never been examined empirically in one study. The proposed framework is further 
delineated in Chapter 3.  
For testing the proposed model, this dissertation uses a sample of firms with IT 
control weaknesses as reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 for the years 2005-
2009. In light of the preceding discussion, a conceptual framework is developed as 
presented in Figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
1.5. Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents a 
review of the extant literature covering two streams of research: (1) internal control 
research in the area of financial statements audit and (2) information technology control 
research in the area of accounting information systems. Particular attention is given to 
those studies that consider IT control weaknesses in the context of auditing internal 
controls over financial reporting. Chapter Three presents the theoretical perspective of the 
research as well as the research hypotheses. The potential determinants of IT control 
weaknesses are delineated and the corresponding hypotheses are developed. Chapter Four 
presents the research methodology, including data sources and empirical research models. 
Chapter Five presents and analyzes the results of the proposed model and hypotheses. 
The conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research are presented in Chapter 
Six. 
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
In the wake of recent high-profile corporate governance scandals (e.g. Enron, 
WorldCom), the United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which 
aims, among other things, to improve corporate governance effectiveness, internal control 
quality, and financial reporting reliability.  
Section 404 of the Act, Management Assessment of Internal Controls, requires 
management of publicly traded companies to assess the design and operating 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and to report that assessment in 
their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), namely in the 
10-K forms. In the same vein, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s 
(PCAOB) Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 requires external auditors of publicly traded 
companies to understand, test, and evaluate the design and operating effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting and to opine on management’s report on the 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (PCAOB 
2007).  
Noteworthy is that, prior to the enactment of SOX, auditors did not formally conduct 
an audit of internal controls. Rather, they assessed internal controls only in conjunction 
with planning the audit (Bryan and Lilien 2005). Furthermore, publicly traded companies 
were required to disclose internal control weaknesses only in the event of changing 
auditors (Krishnan 2005; SEC 1988; Whisenant et al. 2003). Based on the lack of public 
disclosures up to the passage of SOX, research on internal control weaknesses is 
relatively recent. 
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Section 302 of the Act, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, requires that 
the principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or 
persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed with 
the SEC that  
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report, 
(2) the financial statements, and other financial information included in the report, 
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of 
operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report, 
(3) the signing officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal 
control, 
(4)  the signing officers have evaluated the effectiveness of the internal controls, and 
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the auditors and the audit committee of the 
board of directors all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal 
controls and have identified for the auditors any material weaknesses in internal 
controls; and any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or 
other employees who have a significant role in the internal controls (Congress 
2002). 
Recent evidence shows a positive association between SOX and internal control 
quality. For example, a recent survey of 171 internal auditors about their assessment of 
Section 404 benefits reports significant control improvements (Rittenberg and Miller 
2005). In the same vein, Patterson and Smith (2007) examined the effects of SOX on 
auditing and internal control strength. Findings from their study led them to conclude that 
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“Sarbanes-Oxley has the desired effect of inducing stronger internal control systems and 
less fraud, but does not necessarily induce higher levels of control testing” (Patterson and 
Smith 2007). 
Given the pervasiveness and ubiquity of information systems in today’s business 
processes (Canada et al. 2009; Klamm and Watson 2009), and the integral role that IT 
controls play in enabling or constraining internal control quality (Li et al. 2007a; PCAOB 
2007) and financial reporting reliability (Grant et al. 2008; Klamm and Watson 2009), 
financial auditors are explicitly required to consider how an organization’s use of IT may 
affect internal control over financial reporting and how IT control risks could result in 
financial misstatements (AICPA 2007). To this end, auditors of publicly traded 
companies are required to assess the effectiveness of IT controls as they pertain to 
initiating, recording, processing, and reporting transactions or other financial data. 
Further, they are required to ensure that any significant weaknesses in IT controls are 
disclosed in the management’s assessment of internal control over financial reporting 
(AICPA 2007). 
This dissertation is concerned with investigating the weaknesses in IT controls 
reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Here, IT controls are viewed as a 
subset of an organization’s internal control structure (AICPA 2001; Smith 2004). 
Therefore, it is natural that perspectives from internal control and IT control literatures 
would influence the current work.  
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the 
internal control literature with a focus on internal control over financial reporting. Section 
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2.3 reviews the extant literature on IT controls as it relates to internal control over 
financial reporting. Finally, section 2.4 presents a synthesis of the current state of IT 
control and establishes the need for the following chapter. 
2.2. Internal Control 
This section presents a critical review of the extant literature in the area of internal 
controls. Practice-based literature (e.g. COSO 1992), regulatory legislations (e.g. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), auditing standards (e.g. SAS No. 109; AS No. 5), and 
academic research (e.g. Beasley 1996; Beasley et al. 1999; Cohen and Hanno 2000; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Hoitash et al. 2009; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007; Krishnan 
2005) have all emphasized the critical role of internal control structure in ensuring the 
integrity of the financial reporting process.  
The importance of internal control quality is further evident in the dire consequences 
that are associated with internal control weaknesses. More specifically, empirical 
evidence from recent studies shows that internal control weaknesses are associated with 
more financial misstatements (Klamm and Watson 2009), higher risk and cost of capital 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Bryan and Lilien 2005), abnormally negative returns 
(Beneish et al. 2008), shareholders’ dissatisfaction (Ye and Krishnan 2008), negative 
stock price reactions (Gupta and Nayar 2007; Hammersley et al. 2008), higher audit fees 
(Hogan and Wilkins 2005; Hoitash et al. 2008; Raghunandan and Rama 2006), and 
increasing auditor resignations (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Ettredge et al. 2006; 
Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007). It is for these consequences that the objectives of 
ensuring financial reporting reliability, improving internal control quality, and fostering 
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effective corporate governance are at the heart of the recent regulatory changes under 
SOX.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require the management of 
companies subject to Section 404 of SOX to base the evaluation of effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting on a suitable, recognized control framework 
(PCAOB 2007). Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 requires external auditors to perform the 
audit of internal control over financial reporting using the same control framework used 
by management (PCAOB 2007). One such framework that has received wide acceptance 
and that is also recognized by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, is the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s Internal 
Control-Integrated Framework of 1992; also known as the COSO framework.  
Gupta and Thomson (2006) reviewed management’ assessments of internal control as 
filed with the SEC under Item 9A of most 10-K forms. Findings from their survey led 
them to conclude that “almost all the companies are unequivocally claiming that they 
conduct their internal control evaluation in accordance with the COSO 1992 Framework” 
. Along the same lines, Campbell et al. (2006) cited a February 2003 report of the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Research Foundation, titled “Internal Auditors’ Role 
in Corporate Governance,” which revealed that 63% of publicly traded companies use 
the COSO framework of internal control.  
The COSO framework identifies five components of internal control: the control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring. Most recently, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 109 of 2007, 
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titled “Understanding the Entity and its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material 
Misstatement”, embraced the aforementioned components of internal control (AICPA 
2007). 
Geiger et al. (2004) examined the efficacy of the interrelated internal control 
components of the COSO framework in 32 Rhode Island state agencies that used the 
framework. Their study revealed that most internal control deficiencies were found in 
control activities and control environment with the former accounting for 31% of all 
deficiencies identified and the latter accounting for 23%. The authors concluded that “this 
finding may reflect that auditors have historically evaluated control activities in their 
internal control assessments, and may be better prepared to identify these types of 
weaknesses or more apt to search for control activities weaknesses.” . In a similar study, 
Klamm and Watson (2009) examined the interrelatedness of internal control deficiencies 
classified according to the COSO framework. Results from their study provide support of 
the interrelationships of the five COSO components.  
Furthermore, the internal control literature distinguishes between two classes of 
internal control over financial reporting based on the pervasiveness and severity of their 
impact on financial reporting reliability: account or transaction-specific controls and 
entity-level controls. Account-specific controls relate to controls over specific account 
balances or transaction-level processes (Doss and Jonas 2004; Doyle et al. 2007). Entity-
level controls, on the other hand, relate to more macro-level controls such as the control 
environment or the overall financial reporting process. More specifically, the SEC’s final 
management guidance defines entity-level controls as “aspects of a system of internal 
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control that have a pervasive effect on the entity’s system of internal control”.  According 
to the same guidance, entity-level controls include:  
(1) controls related to the control environment (e.g. management’s philosophy and 
operating style, integrity and ethical values, board or audit committee oversight; 
and assignment of authority and responsibility), 
(2) controls over management override, 
(3) the company's risk assessment process, 
(4) centralized processing and controls, including shared service environments, 
(5) controls to monitor results of operations,  
(6) controls to monitor other controls, including activities of the internal audit 
function, the audit committee, and self-assessment programs, and 
(7) controls over the period-end financial reporting process; and policies that address 
significant business control and risk management practices (SEC 2006) 
Using a sample of 261 companies that disclosed at least one material weakness in 
internal control under SOX for the period from August 2002 to November 2004, Ge and 
McVay (2005) found that entity-level material weaknesses in internal control tend to 
relate to deficient revenue-recognition policies, lack of segregation of duties, deficiencies 
in the period-end reporting process and accounting policies, and inappropriate account 
reconciliation. They further found that the most commonly identified account-specific 
material weaknesses occur in the current accrual accounts, such as the accounts 
receivable and inventory accounts.  
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Despite the indirect effect of entity-level controls on the likelihood of detecting or 
preventing a misstatement on a timely basis (Doyle et al. 2007; PCAOB 2007), practice 
and academic literatures seem to suggest that entity-level control weaknesses have more 
serious and negative effects compared to the less severe account-specific control 
weaknesses (Doss and Jonas 2004; Doyle et al. 2007; Gupta and Leech 2005). The 
following excerpt from Doss and Jonas (2004) illustrates Moody’s, (the bond rating 
company), philosophy with respect to the impact of disclosing material weaknesses in 
internal control on ratings:  
We are less concerned about material weaknesses that relate to 
controls over specific account balances or transaction-level processes. 
We refer to these material weaknesses as “Category A” material 
weaknesses. In most cases, we believe that the auditor can effectively 
“audit around” these material weaknesses by performing additional 
substantive procedures in the area where the material weakness exists. 
We expect to give companies reporting Category A material 
weaknesses the benefit of the doubt and not take any related rating 
action, assuming management takes corrective action to address the 
material weakness in a timely manner. Other material weaknesses 
relate to company-level controls such as the control environment or 
the financial reporting process. These material weaknesses, which we 
refer to as “Category B” material weaknesses, may result in us 
bringing a company to rating committee to determine whether a rating 
action is necessary. We are concerned about these material 
weaknesses because we question the ability of the auditor to 
effectively “audit around” problems that have a pervasive effect on a 
company’s financial reporting. Also, Category B material weaknesses 
call into question not only management’s ability to prepare accurate 
financial reports but also its ability to control the business. 
 
Along the same lines, Gupta and Leah (2005) examined the types of internal control 
deficiences reported between November 1, 2003 and October 31, 2004. According to 
their study, internal control deficiencies related to entity-level controls represented the 
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majority of deficiences. Li et al. (2007b) also found that material weaknesses in entity-
level controls are less likely to be remediated compared to the less pervasive account-
specific material weaknesses. 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) examined the impact of reporting deficiencies in 
internal control over financail reporting on audit pricing. They found that audit fees are 
positively associated with material weaknesses. In a simialr study, Hoitash et al. (2008) 
found a significant positive association of audit pricing with both material and significant 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Furthermore, Hoitash et al. (2008) 
report a greater association of audit fees with entity-level control problems than with 
account-specific control weaknesses. The authors offer two potential explanations: (a) the 
companies with internal control weaknesses require the expenditure of greater audit 
engagement effort, and (b) the audutors’ application of risk premia compensates them for 
residual risk. 
Most recently, there has been an effort to investigate the characterisitcs of the 
companies reporting internal control deficiences and the underlying factors that are 
associated with their occurance (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Bryan and Lilien 
2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2007; Krishnan 2005). For example, 
Krishnan (2005) examined the association between audit committee quality and the 
quality of corporate internal control between 1994 and 2000 (hence, before the passage of 
SOX). Using a sample of 128 compnaies that changed auditors and disclosed internal 
control problems and a control sample of companies that changed auditors but did not 
report internal control problems, the study found a negative association between the 
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proportion of independent members on the audit committee and the existence of internal 
control problems. Furthermore, the study found a negative association between the 
number of audit committee members with financial expertise and the existence of internal 
control problems.  
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) studied the role of audit committees and auditors in 
the reporting of internal control deficiencies after the passage of SOX. The study found 
that, in comparison to firms with no weaknesses in their internal conrols, firms that report 
internal control weaknesses are charicterized by higher prior restatements of financial 
statements, higher number of meetings of the audit committee, smaller proportion of 
financial experts in the audit committee, and more auditor changes. These results, 
according to the authors, underscore the important role of internal corporate governance 
characteristics in examining the reporting of internal control weaknesses. 
In the same vien, Li et al. (2007a) examined whether changes in external corporate 
governance characteristics (e.g. nature of audit firm, analyst following, and blockholder 
shareholdings) and internal corporate governance characteristics (e.g. board of director, 
audit committee, and management) are associated with the remediation of internal control 
material weakness disclosures reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Findings from their study show that improvements in internal corporate governance were 
associated with the remediation effort of internal control weaknesses.  External 
governance improvements, however, were not found to be assocaited with the 
remediation of internal control material weaknesses. As noted by the authors, the positive 
association between the improvements in internal corporate governance on one hand and 
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remediation on the other hand, lends further support to the existing internal corporate 
governance regulations by SOX.  
Bryan and Lilien (2005) found that firms with material weaknesses in internal 
controls are, on average, both smaller and worse performers than their matched industry 
counterparts with no material weaknesses. Ge and McVay (2005) also reported that 
disclosing a material weakness in internal control is negatively associated with firm size 
and firm profitability and positively associated with business complexity. Controlling for 
size, profitability, and complexity, they found a positive association between the 
disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control and the size of the audit firm. To 
this end, the authors note that “since large audit firms are exposed to a greater legal 
liability, they might be more diligent about searching for, and reporting, material 
weaknesses” . 
In two concurrent studies, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Doyle et al. (2007) 
examined the determinants of internal control problems. More specifically, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2007) examined the determinants of internal control deficiencies based on a 
sample of 326 firms that disclosed material weaknesses, significant deficiencies and 
control deficiencies for Section 302 of SOX and prior to audits mandated by Section 404 
of the Act (i.e., from November 2003 to December 31, 2004). They found that, relative to 
non-disclosers, firms disclosing internal control deficiencies have more complex 
operations, more recent changes in organizational structure, greater accounting risk, 
higher incidents of auditor resignations prior to the disclosure of internal control 
deficiencies and fewer resources to invest in internal control. 
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Using a sample of 779 firms disclosing material weaknesses from August 2002 to 
2005, Doyle et al. (2007) examined determinants of material weaknesses in internal 
control and how the determinants of internal control problems differ based on the severity 
of material weaknesses disclosed (the more serious entity-level versus the less severe 
account-specific) and the stated reason of material weaknesses disclosed (staffing, 
complexity, and general). Findings from the study indicate that firms with internal control 
weaknesses were smaller in size, younger in age, weaker in financial health, more 
complex in operations, faster in growth, or undergoing restructuring. In addition, the 
study found that firms with more serious entity-level control problems are smaller, 
younger, and weaker financially, while firms with less severe account-specific problems 
are healthy financially but have complex, diversified, and rapidly changing operations. 
Furthermore, the study found that the determinants of internal control weaknesses vary 
based on the specific reason for the material weakness. 
2.3. IT Control Over Financial Reporting 
This section presents a critical review of the extant literature on IT controls, a subset 
of internal control. As part of assessing the effectiveness of internal controls over 
financial reporting, AU Section (319) requires management and auditors of companies 
subject to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to test and evaluate the effectiveness of 
IT controls and report any significant IT-related weaknesses in their annual filing with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (AICPA 2007).  
For the purpose of this research, IT control is defined as a manual or automated 
process designed by, or under the supervision of, the company’s principal executive and 
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principal IT officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the 
company’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial information and transactions and the 
continued proper operation of the information systems that capture, process, and generate 
them.  
The IT control literature distinguishes between two classes of IT controls: application 
controls which are considered a type of account-specific internal controls and general 
controls which are considered a type of entity-level internal controls (SEC 2006). As the 
name suggests, application controls relate to individual computer applications. More 
specifically, they relate to detecting and preventing the financial misstatement and 
financial fraud risks associated with using IT to initiate, record, process, and report 
transactions or other financial data. These controls help ensure that transactions are 
authorized, and completely and accurately recorded and processed. Application controls 
may be automated (e.g. automated reconciliation of subsystems, an application that 
updates accounts in the general ledger for sub-ledger activity, an application control that 
tests input and output accuracy, etc) or exclusively or primarily manual but dependent on 
IT functionality (e.g. a control that manually investigates items contained in a computer 
generated exception report). When application controls are performed by people 
interacting with IT, they may be referred to as user controls (AICPA 2007, paragraphs 
43-44; SEC 2006).  
General controls, on the other hand, are defined as policies and procedures that relate 
to many applications and support the effective functioning of application controls by 
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helping to ensure the continued proper operation of information systems. General 
controls commonly include controls over data center and network operations, access 
security, IT management, system development, data security, change management, and 
business continuity planning (AICPA 2007, paragraph 45; Norman et al. 2009).  
Faced with increasingly computerized business environments where key business 
processes including accounting and financial reporting are entirely automated or 
exclusively or primarily manual but largely dependent on IT functionality, auditing 
standards (e.g. SAS No. 94, SAS No. 109; AS No. 5), practice literature (e.g. COSO 
1992; COBIT, 1996), and academic research (e.g. Bell et al. 1998; Canada et al. 2009; 
Grant et al. 2008; Klamm and Watson 2009; Li et al. 2007a; Messier Jr et al. 2004; 
Sutton and Hampton 2003) have all emphasized the integral role that information systems 
and IT controls play in enabling or constraining internal control quality, financial 
reporting reliability, and Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. To this end, a report by AMR 
Research, now a part of Gartner Inc., estimates that companies subject to SOX spent 
roughly six billion U.S. dollars a year in 2005 and 2006 to comply with the Act, 1.9 
billion of which (i.e., 32%) was spent on IT (Bradford and Brazel 2007). 
Audit standards setting bodies (e.g. AICPA; PCOAB) have increasingly emphasized 
that management and external auditors consider the effect of computerized systems and 
IT control risks when evaluating the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting. Especially noteworthy is that the identification of information systems and IT 
control risks is not viewed as a separate evaluation but rather as an integral part of the 
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top-down approach used to identify the significant accounts and disclosures and the 
internal controls to test as part of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance (PCAOB 2007).  
For example, AU Section (319), titled “Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit,” explicitly requires auditors to consider how an organization’s 
use of IT may affect internal controls relevant to the audit of financial statements and 
how IT risks could result in financial misstatements (AICPA 2007). More specifically, 
AU Section (319) requires auditors to obtain sufficient knowledge of how IT affects the 
following: 
(1) the transactions in the entity’s operations that are significant to the financial 
statements, 
(2) the procedures by which transactions significant to the financial statements are 
initiated, recorded, processed, and reported from their occurrence to their 
inclusion in the financial statements,  
(3) the related accounting records, supporting information, and specific accounts in 
the financial statements involved in initiating, recording, processing, and 
reporting transactions, and  
(4) the financial reporting process including the procedures used to prepare the 
entity's financial statements and related disclosures, and how misstatements may 
occur (AU Section 319.49-51 (AICPA 2007).  
In the same vein, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 94, titled  The Effect of 
Information Technology on the Auditor’s Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit, alerts external auditors that assessing control risk at maximum 
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and relying only on substantive testing may not be effective for companies with 
intensively computerized financial reporting systems.  To this end, the standard advises 
financial auditors to use computer-related audit procedures when obtaining an 
understanding of client internal controls during audit planning (AICPA 2001). Moreover, 
SAS No. 94 requires auditors to consider whether specialized skills, possessed by 
auditor’s staff or obtained through the use of IT audit specialists, are needed to determine 
the effect of IT on the audit, to understand the IT controls, or to design and perform tests 
of IT controls (AICPA 2001). 
Academic research has also drawn attention to the impact of computerization and IT 
control problems on financial reporting and internal controls over financial reporting.  
Three strands of research can be recognized: (a) research on the impact of 
computerization on internal control and financial reporting reliability, (b) research on the 
impact of IT control quality on a host of issues including internal control quality, 
financial reporting reliability, financial performance, and audit fees, and (c) most recently 
research on the characteristics of firms reporting IT-related control weaknesses. 
Evidence in the extant literature on the effect of computerization on financial 
statements suggests that computerized environments are more prone to internal control 
problems and financial misstatements than partially computerized or non-computerized 
environments (Bell et al. 1998; Canada et al. 2009; Hunton et al. 2004; Messier Jr et al. 
2004). For example, Bell et al. (1998) examined the impact of computerization of 
information systems on the misstatement of financial information and whether the causes 
of misstatements vary between computerized systems and non-computerized systems. 
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Findings from the study suggest that misstatements are more likely to occur when 
accounting information systems are computerized than when they are not. In a similar 
study, Messier et al. (2004) found that the missing and poorly designed controls and the 
excessive workload for accounting personnel were more likely to be causes of 
misstatements in computerized business processes than in non-computerized business 
processes. Findings from Lynch and Gomaa (2003), who investigated the potential 
impact of information technology on the vulnerability of organizations to fraudulent 
employee behavior, show that information systems may provide sophisticated means and 
opportunities for fraud perpetration by employees. Consistent finds were reported in 
Beasley et al. (2000) and Ge and McVay (2005). 
Using a sample of 261 companies disclosing at least one material weakness in 
internal control in their SEC filings from August 2002 to November 2004, Ge and 
McVay (2005) found that the greatest concentration of firms disclosing material 
weaknesses in internal control was in the computers industry with 21.4 percent of the 
material weakness firms. Notably, this percentage is far greater than the proportion of 
computer companies to all 2003 Compustat firms (13.7 percent). Moreover, the study 
found that 40 percent of ‘revenue recognition’ deficiencies occur within the computers 
industry; a finding that is consistent with Beasley et al. (2000) who reported a very high 
incidence of revenue fraud in technology companies. While the causality between 
computerization and IT control, on one hand, and disclosing internal control deficiencies, 
on the other hand, is not directly discussed by Ge and McVay (2005), the concentration 
of internal control deficiencies in the computers industry, presumably highly 
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computerized, provide support of the pervasive impact of information systems and IT 
control on a company’s internal control system. 
Along the same lines, evidence suggests that significant financial reporting 
implications may arise from relatively simple to extremely complex information systems 
(Curtis et al. 2009). For instance, there exists substantial evidence suggesting that ERP 
systems lead to heightened risks (IT, business, and overall control risks) and higher 
likelihood for financial misstatements, misclassifications, and defalcations (Hunton et al. 
2004; Pfennig 1999; Sutton and Hampton 2003; Turner 1999). Less complex 
computerized systems, such as spreadsheets, have also been reported to cause internal 
control deficiencies and financial reporting problems (EUSPRIG).  
The reported association between the complexity of computerized information 
systems and the heightened likelihood of internal control deficiencies, financial 
misstatements, and/or fraud perpetration has important implications for management and 
auditors. Generally, the more complex a computerized environment, the higher the 
overall control risks, the greater the complexity of assessing IT and internal control risks 
(Hunton et al. 2004; O'Donnell et al. 2000), and the greater the complexity of audit 
procedures in terms of the nature, staffing, timing, and extent of the audit testing (Brazel 
and Agoglia 2007; Janvrin et al. 2009). 
In addition, recent evidence on IT control quality points to a host of negative 
consequences associated with having IT control weaknesses. More specifically, empirical 
evidence from recent studies shows that IT control weaknesses are associated with a 
larger number of internal control deficiencies (Grant et al. 2008), a larger number of 
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financial misstatements (Bedard and Graham 2011; Canada et al. 2009; Grant et al. 2008; 
Klamm and Watson 2009), lower financial performance (Stoel and Muhanna 2009), and 
higher audit fees (Grant et al. 2008). 
Bedard and Graham (2011) examined a sample of companies with problems in 
internal control over financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for 
the fiscal year 2004-2005. Results from their study show that 21.4% of all deficiencies in 
internal control over financial reporting were related to IT. Canada et al. (2009), also 
covering the same period, reported a slightly lower percentage (20.8%) of companies 
disclosing material weaknesses in their internal controls with at least one IT control 
weakness. A consistent finding was  also reported by Grant et al. (2008) with 20% of 
accelerated filers having at least one control deficiency related to IT controls in the first 
three years of the Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 compliance. Further results from their 
study indicate that companies with IT control weaknesses report significantly more 
internal control deficiencies (other than IT) than companies with no IT-control 
weaknesses.  Klamm and Watson (2009) also found that firms with IT-related 
weaknesses report more non-IT-related material weaknesses than firms without IT-
related weak components. These findings provide support not only to the pervasive 
nature of IT controls but also to the notion that IT control weaknesses exacerbate internal 
control deficiencies.  
Grant et al. (2008) examined the impact of IT control weaknesses on financial 
reporting and financial misstatements. As noted by the authors, “six of the ten most 
commonly occurring accounting errors occur significantly more often in IT deficient 
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companies than non-IT deficient companies. These six accounting errors involved 
accounts with a high-level of transaction-based activity common to enterprise systems.” 
(p. 803). Klamm and Watson (2009) report that firms with IT-related weaknesses report 
more misstatements than firms without IT-related weaknesses. They further note that “the 
existence of an IT-related weakness generally has an incremental negative effect on 
reporting reliability.” Combined together, these findings are indicative of the pervasive 
nature of IT controls and their impact on financial reporting quality.  
Stoel and Muhanna (2009) examine the impact of having material IT control 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting on financial performance. Results 
from their study indicate that firms reporting IT control weaknesses have lower 
accounting earnings compared to firms with strong IT controls. A possible explanation of 
the association between financial performance and IT-control deficiencies is that firms 
with poorer financial performance have fewer resources to allocate towards putting an 
effective IT control system in place. Another explanation may have to do with the 
expenditures that these firms incur to correct internal control weaknesses including IT-
related problems. A third possible explanation is the disruptions to operations due to IT 
material weaknesses. In addition, Stoel and Muhanna (2009) found that IT control 
weaknesses moderate the association between accounting earnings and market valuation, 
with firms reporting weaknesses in IT controls having a lower earnings response 
coefficient. As noted by the authors, “information systems risk is priced by the capital 
markets”. Hence, IT control weaknesses are costly.  
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Further evidence on the cost of IT control weaknesses is found in Grant et al. (2008) 
and Canada et al. (2009) who examined the association between material weaknesses in 
IT control and audit fees. Both studies report that firms with IT control weaknesses are 
associated with higher audit fees when compared to firms with material weaknesses that 
are non-IT control related and firms with no material weaknesses. Echoing Hoitash et al. 
(2008), cited above, the positive association between audit fees and IT control 
weaknesses can be attributed to the idea that companies with IT control weaknesses 
require the expenditure of greater audit engagement effort. Another explanation could be 
the need to utilize the service of IT audit specialists. As noted by Curtis et al. (2009), “it 
might be assumed that the increased audit costs after discovery of material misstatements 
signal greater use of IS auditors, who typically bill at higher hourly fees than generalist 
auditors”. 
Most recently, there has been an effort to investigate the characterisitcs of the 
companies reporting IT control deficiences and the structural factors underlying their 
occurance. Li et al. (2007a) examined the impact of internal and external governance on 
IT control quality for companies reporting IT-related material weaknesses in 2005. 
Findings from the study show that companies with favorable internal governance 
characteristics, specifically having more IT-experienced senior managers, CIO positions 
or longer tenured CIOs, are less likely to report IT-related material weaknesses. As for 
the influence of external governance characteristics, the study found that companies with 
higher percentages of independent board directors are associated with fewer IT material 
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weaknesses. However, partial evidence was found in support of the notion that more IT-
experienced audit committee members are associated with fewer IT material weaknesses.  
2.4. Synthesis 
While research on IT control quality provides answers regarding the influence of IT 
control weaknesses on internal control deficiencies (Bedard and Graham 2011; Canada et 
al. 2009; Grant et al. 2008), financial reporting reliability (Grant et al. 2008; Klamm and 
Watson 2009), financial performance (Stoel and Muhanna 2009), management earnings 
forecast (Li et al. 2010) and audit fees (Canada et al. 2009; Grant et al. 2008), several 
other questions pertinent to IT control weaknesses remain unanswered. The current 
research attempts to answer the following two questions: 
(1) What are the antecedents of IT control weaknesses reported under Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002? 
(2) In what ways do the identified antecedents have an impact on IT control 
weaknesses? 
While recent studies have investigated the determinants of weaknesses in internal 
control over financial reporting (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007), 
there is a paucity in theory-driven research on the antecedents of IT control weaknesses 
resulting in a lack of understanding of the determinants of IT control quality. In fact, 
apart from Li et al.’s (2007a) study, this dissertation knows of no other research that has 
investigated the determinants of IT control weaknesses. Li et al.’s (2007a) study, 
however, suffers from three major limitations: (a) lack of theoretical grounding, (b) 
failure to consider other factors other than IT governance that may impact IT control 
35 
 
quality, and (c) employing data from only the first year of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 
compliance. 
Without a solid understanding of the determinants of IT control weaknesses, how 
they interact, and how they vary in terms of the magnitude and direction of their 
influence, the organizational endeavor to achieve effective IT control is likely to fail. For 
instance, such lack of understanding could lead organizations to direct their attention and 
much needed resources towards certain governance mechanisms while ignoring others 
that are more critical for achieving quality IT controls. Worse yet, organizations could 
unconsciously put in place mechanisms that have conflicting influences on IT control 
quality. 
The current study contributes to the existing literature by presenting an integrated 
theoretical model of the antecedents of IT control weaknesses. The proposed model 
draws on agency theory to provide a theoretical perspective of the occurrence of IT 
control weaknesses and the IT governance literature and the executive compensation 
literature to solicit potential factors that enhance or impede the achievement of effective 
IT controls. To this end, two categories of governance mechanisms were identified as 
potentially impacting IT control quality. These categories are: IT governance 
mechanisms and CIO incentive alignment mechanisms. For testing the proposed model, 
this dissertation uses a sample of firms with IT control weaknesses as reported under 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 for the years 2005-2009.  
By presenting and empirically testing a theory-based framework of the antecedents of 
IT control weaknesses, this dissertation offers a much needed understanding for (a) 
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managers in their effort to achieve effective IT governance and thus improve the quality 
of IT control and internal control over financial reporting, (b) financial auditors in their 
effort to obtain an understanding of what impacts IT control quality in a financial 
statement audit, and (c) regulators in their effort to improve financial reporting quality 
and foster effective corporate governance.  
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Chapter 3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE & HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. An Agency Theory Perspective 
In spite of the evident impact of IT control weaknesses on the overall quality of 
internal control structure, the IT control research, especially in the area of IT control 
weaknesses, remains largely anecdotal with limited reliance on theory. This research 
proposes and tests an integrated theoretical model of the antecedents of IT control 
weaknesses. More specifically, this dissertation draws on agency theory (Eisenhardt 
1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976) to provide a theoretical perspective of the occurrence 
and subsequent disclosure of IT control weaknesses. In general, an agency situation arises 
whenever one party (the principal) relies on another party (the agent) to perform some 
service on its behalf which typically involves the delegation of some decision making 
authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The current work utilizes agency theory as the theoretical basis for two reasons: (1) 
the dominance of the this theory as the guiding framework for corporate governance 
(Daily et al. 1998) of which IT governance is a subset and (2) the fact that the 
information systems (IS) function is in essence an agent that provides IT solutions and 
services to a principal; other business functions and the organization as a whole. In the 
context of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the principal is the board of directors 
(BOD) who delegates to the top management team (TMT) the responsibility of corporate 
governance including internal control over financial reporting. The agent, on the other 
hand, is the top IS team (TIST) to whom the TMT delegates the responsibility of IT 
control governance. Such delegation is normally caused by business functions’ lacking 
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the time and resources, specifically specialized IT skills and knowledge, which are 
necessary to govern IT control over financial reporting.  
A central problem that could arise in such principal-agent relationship is one of moral 
hazard or goal incongruence; a situation where agents engage in self-interested behavior 
driven by their own objectives and interests rather than those of their principals (Baiman 
1982; Baiman 1990; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Evidence from agency theory literature 
indicates that when such goal incongruence occurs, it could lead to the principal’s 
interests being ill-served by the agent which could prove very harmful to the well-being 
of the principal. Extrapolated to the context of IT control weaknesses, this evidence 
would suggest that the occurrence and subsequent disclosure of IT control weaknesses is 
a manifestation of an agency problem caused by goal disagreement between the BOD and 
the TIST.  
The first question that arises is: why would such goal incongruence occur? More 
specifically, why would the top IS team, as an agent, have different goals and/or be less 
committed to designing and implementing a system of IT controls that is consistent with 
the organization’s internal control objectives? According to agency theory, goal 
incongruence between the principal and the agent is affected by information. (Baiman 
1982; Eisenhardt 1989; Tuttle et al. 1997). To this end, agents are less motivated to act in 
a way that is contrary to the objectives of their organizations when the principals possess 
some or complete information that enable them (i.e., the principals) to verify the quality 
and adequacy of the agents’ actions; a condition known as information symmetry. 
However, when the principals cannot completely monitor and verify the actions of the 
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agents due to an information gap, the condition becomes one of information asymmetry 
(Baiman 1982; Tuttle et al. 1997). Here, agents are said to possess privately held 
information or knowledge which could motivate them to act contrary to the objectives of 
their organizations without fearing detection. 
Another explanation as to what could cause the goal incongruence is offered by 
motivation theories such as expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) and equity theory (Adams 
1965). That is, when people have unfavorable perceptions about their performance 
outcomes (e.g. recognition, rewards, pay), they are more likely to engage in self-
interested behavior. Furthermore, when people perceive the ratio of their outcomes to 
their inputs (e.g. effort, education, expertise) to be inequitable to that of their referents, 
the situation becomes one of perceived inequity which can cause them to behave in ways 
that are not in line with the objectives of their organizations (Henderson and Fredrickson 
2001; Lazear 1989). In the context of the current study, this would suggest that IT 
executives who perceive their outcomes unfavorably or as inequitable are more likely to 
engage in self-interested behavior driven by their own objectives as opposed to those of 
their organizations. 
The second question that follows is: how can the TIST, whose motives may not be 
aligned with those of the organization, be influenced to behave in a way that is consistent 
with the organization’s internal control objectives? According to the corporate 
governance literature, the answer to this agency problem involves development and 
implementation of effective governance mechanisms whose aim is to reduce the agency 
costs and provide monitoring over the actions of the agent (Coles et al. 2001; Daily et al. 
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2003a; Daily et al. 2003b). More specifically, this research adopts the view that there are 
two important categories of governance and/or contracting mechanisms that the BOD can 
employ in order to align the interests of the TIST with the interests of the firm. These 
categories are: IT governance mechanisms and IT executive incentive alignment 
mechanisms. 
3.1.1 IT Governance and IT Control Quality 
Boynton et al. (1992) define IT governance as “the locus of decision making for IT-
related processes within a firm where the concern is with the location, distribution, and 
pattern of managerial responsibilities and control that ultimately affect how IT resources 
are applied and then implemented” (Boynton et al. 1992). The IT Governance Institute 
defines IT governance as “an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the 
leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s 
IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategies and objectives”(ITGI). Another 
definition is offered by Weill and Ross (2004) who define IT governance as “specifying 
the decision rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in the 
use of IT”. Two underlying themes can be noted in the aforementioned definitions: the 
locus of decision authority and responsibility for IT-related activities and processes and 
the alignment between business and IT to ensure desirable behavior in the use of IT. 
In theory, IT governance; an integral part of corporate governance, is the 
responsibility of the board of directors. In practice, however, the board delegates the 
responsibility of corporate governance including internal control over financial reporting 
to the TMT, primarily the CEO and CFO. The TMT, in turn, delegates fully or partially 
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to the TIST the authority to make key IT control decisions as well as the responsibility to 
design and implement IT controls over financial reporting systems. Drawing on the IT 
governance literature, this research proposes two IT governance elements to influence the 
alignment between the TIST and the BOD: (1) the IT background element which includes 
(a) the IT background of the corporate governance committee, (b) the IT background of 
the audit committee and (c) the IT background of the top management team (TMT) and 
(2) the IT executive element in terms of whether or not the firm has a CIO and the power 
of the CIO. 
The responsibilities of the corporate governance committee include, but are not 
limited to, reviewing and making recommendations to the BOD regarding matters 
pertaining to corporate governance, reviewing the composition of committees of the BOD 
including the audit committee, and recommending persons to be members of such 
committees. The audit committee, on the other hand, is responsible, among other things, 
for reviewing the company’s system of internal control over financial reporting, 
monitoring the integrity of the company’s financial statements, and ensuring the 
company’s compliance with laws and regulations including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002. To this end, the Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 requires external auditors of 
publicly traded companies to communicate, in writing, to the audit committee all material 
weaknesses in internal control as identified during the audit of internal control over 
financial reporting. This written communication should be made prior to the issuance of 
the auditor's report on internal control over financial reporting. In light of these 
responsibilities, it can be argued that corporate governance committees with IT 
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background are more likely to recommend IT experienced persons for the membership of 
the audit committee. 
Drawing on agency theory and the notion of information asymmetry, this research 
expects organizations with IT-experienced corporate governance and audit committees to 
exhibit lower levels of IT knowledge gap and thus lower information asymmetry between 
the BOD and the TIST. The same is true for firms with IT-experienced TMTs. In such 
organizations, the BOD and the TMT are in a better position to monitor and verify the 
actions taken by the TIST in the course of governing IT controls over financial reporting. 
At the same time, the TIST, whose actions are being monitored and verified, is less 
motivated to implement a system of IT controls that is not consistent with the 
organization’s internal control objectives. This, in turn, is expected to result in better IT 
controls; hence fewer IT control weaknesses.  
Moreover, IT knowledgeable boards and top management teams are likely to have a 
better understanding and appreciation of the risks associated with using IT in capturing 
and processing business and financial transactions and the negative impact of IT control 
weaknesses on internal control and financial reporting. Further, organizations with IT 
experienced corporate governance and audit committees are more likely to instruct the 
TMT to provide adequate support and resources to the TIST to design and implement an 
effective system of IT controls and to resolve IT control weaknesses as they arise. This, 
in turn, results in fewer IT control weaknesses. Therefore, this research posits that: 
H1a: Companies with corporate governance committee members who 
do not have an IT-related background are more likely to have IT control 
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weaknesses relative to companies with corporate governance committee 
members who have an IT-related background. 
H1b: Companies with audit committee members who do not have an 
IT-related background are more likely to have IT control weaknesses 
relative to companies with audit committee members who have an IT-
related background. 
H1c: Companies with top management team members who do not have 
an IT-related background are more likely to have IT control weaknesses 
relative to companies with top management team members who have 
an IT-related background. 
 
The second IT governance element is the IT executive. For the sake of simplicity and 
consistency with the extant literature, the current study uses the chief information officer 
(CIO) title to refer to the top IT executive in an organization. Numerous IS researchers 
have emphasized the fundamental role that CIOs play in dictating the performance of and 
deriving value from IT in organizations (Earl and Feeny 1995; Preston et al. 2008; 
Raghunathan and Raghunathan 1989). Figure 2, adopted from Preston et al. (2008), 
presents a summary of the literature on the CIO’s influences on organizational 
performance. 
While there is an extant body of research on the impact of CIOs on organizational 
performance, the research on the impact of CIOs on the quality of IT control over 
financial reporting remains fairly new.  
Recent empirical evidence indicates that firms with CIO positions are less likely to 
have IT-related control weaknesses (e.g. Li et al. 2007a). Notwithstanding this evidence, 
it is important to note that many firms with CIO positions still disclosed IT control 
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weaknesses. This suggests that the impact of the IT executive on the quality of IT control 
goes beyond the presence of the position itself. One way to further investigate this impact 
is by considering IT executive power and his/her decision making authority within an 
organization. Here, power is seen as an enabler of authority. Finkelstein (1992) 
distinguishes between four dimensions of power: structural power, expert power, 
ownership power and prestige power. This research focuses on the first two dimensions 
because prestige power and ownership power are more relevant to chief executive 
officers (Preston et al. 2008).  
 
Figure 2: CIO's impact on organizational outcome, adopted from Preston et al. 2008 
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The extant CIO literature describes CIO structural power in terms of the CIO’s formal 
membership in the TMT (Preston et al. 2008; Raghunathan and Raghunathan 1989). The 
CIO is expected to have greater authority in influencing the performance of IT in 
organizations including the quality of IT control over financial reporting when the 
organization officially elevates his/her power so that he/she is at peer level with other 
executives in the top management team. Echoing an argument by Preston et al. (2008), 
the current study argues that a CIO who is (is not) at peer level with the firm’s TMT will 
be more likely (less likely) to be accepted into the firm’s inner circle and therefore will be 
more successful (less successful) in influencing other members of the TMT (Chatterjee et 
al. 2001; Earl and Feeny 1995; Preston et al. 2008). Therefore, the following hypothesis 
will be tested: 
H2a: Companies with CIOs who have a lower level of structural power 
are more likely to have IT control weaknesses relative to companies 
with CIOs who have a higher level of structural power. 
 
Regarding expert power, there exists evidence in the extant literature to suggest that 
the decision making authority of executives is not only contingent on their possession of 
relevant expertise in their respective functional areas but also on how other members of 
the TMT perceive their effectiveness (Preston et al. 2008; Yukl and Yukl 2002). 
Accordingly, and consistent with Preston et al. (2008), the CIO expert power is described 
in terms of the extent to which the CIO is perceived as effective by the other members of 
the TMT. Here, the perceived effectiveness of the CIO is seen as important as, if not 
more important than, the possession of IT expertise.  
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The perceived effectiveness of the CIO can be further described in terms of how long 
the CIO has been in the current position. Drawing on stewardship theory, the current 
research views longer CIO tenure as indicative of effectiveness and good stewardship. 
CIOs that are perceived to be good stewards will be entrusted by the TMT to make key 
IT decisions (Chan et al. 2006) and will retain their positions longer than CIOs that are 
perceived to be ineffective. Furthermore, the present study argues that longer CIO tenure 
enables CIOs to build stronger and more lasting relationships with other members of the 
TMT giving the CIO greater latitude in advising and influencing other TMT members 
(Earl and Feeny 1995; Preston et al. 2008). Moreover, longer CIO tenure enables the CIO 
to obtain a more comprehensive and undisrupted understanding of the organization’s 
information systems; its structures, strengths and weaknesses; and also the organization’s 
overall operations. Not only is this understanding paramount to a CIO’s ability to align IT 
and business and thus derive value from IT but it is also critical to the CIO’s ability to 
manage and mitigate the risks associated with using IT.  Therefore, this research posits 
that: 
H2b: Companies with CIOs who have lower expert power are more 
likely to have IT control weaknesses relative to companies with CIOs 
who have higher expert power. 
 
3.1.2 CIO Compensation and IT Control Quality 
While this research acknowledges the importance of IT governance mechanisms in 
decreasing information asymmetry and increasing alignment between the BOD and the 
TIST, it also recognizes the reality that the behavior of the TIST is subject to the 
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influence of multiple factors. Therefore, a pragmatic theoretical perspective must 
consider other mechanisms that influence IT control quality either directly or indirectly 
through influencing the TIST’s behavior. One such mechanism is executive 
compensation structure. 
The executive compensation stream of research, firmly grounded in agency theory 
(Daily et al. 2003b; Murphy 1999), argues that organizations need to engage in incentive 
contracting with the TMT to address the agency problem caused by information 
asymmetry and the high costs associated with monitoring the TMT’s behavior. As such, 
executive compensation structure is viewed as an alignment mechanism which the board 
of directors can use to motivate TMT members to align their interests with those of the 
shareholders (Coles et al. 2001; Core et al. 1999; Daily et al. 2003b; Himmelberg et al. 
1999).  
Studies within this stream of research examine the association between TMT pay and 
firm performance with a majority investigating the relation between CEO compensation 
and firm performance. The focus on CEO pay can be attributed to the crucial role of 
CEOs as heads of TMTs and the implicit view of the CEO pay as a proxy for the TMT 
pay (Jonas 2007).  
Recently, and as more executive compensation data became available, many studies 
extended their examination to include the association between TMT pay disparity and 
firm performance (e.g., Carpenter and Sanders 2004; Henderson and Fredrickson 2001; 
Main et al. 1993). Generally, when employees perceive the ratio of their performance 
outcomes (e.g. compensation, promotion, etc) to their inputs (e.g. effort, time, education, 
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skills, etc) to be lower than that of others, the situation becomes one of perceived inequity  
(Adams 1965). Within the context of executive compensation research, a central theme is 
that TMT pay disparity that is perceived to be inequitable can cause members of the TMT 
to engage in self-interested and uncollaborative behavior (Henderson and Fredrickson 
2001; Lazear 1989) leading to negative impacts on firm performance (Carpenter and 
Sanders 2004). 
Drawing on the executive compensation literature, the present study argues that CIO 
compensation influences the CIO’s behavior and the alignment between the organization 
and the TIST in two ways. First, CIO absolute pay is viewed as an incentive alignment 
mechanism. That is, CIO compensation is a means to reduce agency costs and to induce 
the CIO to make IT-related decisions and take actions that are in line with IT governance 
objectives (e.g. create value from IT, mitigate IT risks, and achieve regulatory 
compliance). As the level of CIO absolute pay increases, the CIO’s motivation to engage 
in behaviors or actions that are not in the best interest of the organization is reduced. 
Therefore, CIOs with higher absolute compensations should be more committed towards 
enhancing the quality of IT controls and correcting IT control weaknesses as they arise. 
This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3a: Companies with CIOs who have lower absolute pay are more 
likely to have IT control weaknesses relative to companies with CIOs 
who have higher absolute pay. 
 
Second, CIO relative pay, measuring the pay disparity between the CIO and other 
members of the TMT, is viewed as a proxy of CIO perceptions of equity. Here, lower 
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relative pay is seen as indicative of higher level of perceived inequity. Evidence from the 
executive compensation literature and pay disparity research indicates that inequity 
perceptions can cause members of the TMT to engage in self-interested behavior. 
Extrapolated to the context of the CIO-TMT pay disparity, this evidence would suggest 
that CIOs who perceive their compensations as inequitable will be less committed to 
organizational objectives and thus less motivated to design and put in place a system of 
IT controls that is consistent with the organization’s internal control objectives. 
The present study views the CIO-TMT pay gap as a proxy of CIOs level of 
acceptance by other members of the TMT. That is, a higher (lower) pay gap between the 
CIO and other members of the TMT is an indication of a lower (higher) level of CIO 
acceptance by the TMT. As such, CIOs who are faced with lower levels of acceptance 
should be less committed to organizational objectives. Such CIOs, whose inputs may not 
be valued or even sought by the TMT, are less likely to collaborate and coordinate with 
other members of the TMT and less motivated to implement effective IT controls. This, 
in turn, could be expected to result in lower quality IT controls; hence, more IT control 
weaknesses. Based on the preceding discussion, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H3b: Companies with CIOs who have lower relative pay are more 
likely to have IT control weaknesses relative to companies with CIOs 
who have higher relative pay. 
3.2. Summary of Hypotheses and Research Model 
Table 1 below summarizes the hypotheses and respective expectations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Except for H1b, H1c and H2b, of which close variations were tested in Li et al. 
(2007a), the hypothesized relationships are original and theory-driven and have never 
been examined empirically in a single study. In light of the hypothesized relationships, a 
research model is presented in Figure 3. This model places IT governance and CIO 
alignment incentive mechanisms in a nomological network relating these mechanisms to 
the presence (absence) of IT control weaknesses. 
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Figure 3: Theoretical Research Model 
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Chapter 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, the data sources and the sample selection criteria are presented. Next, 
the study variables are identified as well as how they are measured. Finally, the research 
method and the statistical models are described. These models will be used to test the 
research hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
Data for this research comes from two main sources: Audit Analytics database and 
proxy statements.  Coverage in these data sources is required for firms to be included in 
the sample. 
The initial study sample consists of firms that reported IT control weaknesses under 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the years 2005-2009. Given the unique nature of 
foreign firms in terms of the varying legal, cultural, political, and economic environments 
in which they operate and in order to avoid the complexities and discrepancies that may 
arise from currency conversions (e.g. currency rate fluctuations, purchasing power 
disparity), such firms are eliminated from the study sample.  
The identification of IT control weakness firms is performed in two steps. The first 
step involves identifying firms with internal control weaknesses. Audit Analytics 
database tabulates a wide range of variables pertaining to companies subject to SOX 
Section 404 compliance. Noteworthy is that Audit Analytics has been widely used in both 
internal control studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Doyle et al. 2007) and IT 
control studies (e.g. Klamm and Watson 2009; Li et al. 2007a). Of special interest is a 
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dummy variable (Yes/No) in Audit Analytics indicating the effectiveness (or 
ineffectiveness) of firms’ internal controls as reported in the auditor’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, namely 10-K reports. Thus, the 
initial pool of firms consists of those firms that received an adverse opinion on their 
internal controls from January 2005 to December 2009. The second step involves 
identifying IT control weakness firms. For each of the firms identified in the first step 
above, the different categories of internal control weaknesses as reported in Audit 
Analytics are examined to identify the firms that reported at least one IT-related 
weakness.  
Following the recommendations of Barber and Lyon (1997) and Desai et al. (2006), 
and the approach used by Li et al. (2007a) and Grant et al. (2008), the present study uses 
Audit Analytics to identify a control group of firms that reported non-IT control 
weaknesses during the study period. Firms in the study sample and the control group are 
matched on industry (4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC) and size (revenues) so that each firm 
with an IT-related weakness is matched with a similar control firm that reported internal 
control weaknesses but no IT weaknesses. This should provide a baseline for 
understanding the incremental impact of the proposed governance elements on the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses. If a match is not found, the IT control weakness firm 
is dropped from the sample. 
Data on IT governance and executive compensation are available in the annual proxy 
statements which publicly traded firms are required to file in compliance with SEC 
regulations. I hand-collect this data by searching these statements using Mergent Online 
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database which provides a full text Internet-based search into a wide range of data 
including SEC filings. 
For each firm in the study sample and the control group, I search the proxy statements 
for information about the educational and professional background of the individuals who 
were members of its corporate governance committee, audit committee, and top 
management team in the year of disclosing an internal control weakness or the preceding 
year. I carefully read the biographies of these members as disclosed in the proxy 
statements to determine if they have IT background or not. For example, if a member 
previously held an IT executive position, held a senior executive position in an IT 
company (e.g. software, programming, database or Internet companies), worked as an IT 
auditor/consultant, or received a university degree in an IT related field (e.g. computer 
science, information systems), I consider this individual as having an IT background. 
Next, I search the proxy statements for information on whether or not a firm had an 
IT executive in the year of disclosing an internal control weakness or the preceding year. 
Given the fact that IT executives’ titles vary among organizations, I use a host of job 
titles in my search: chief information officer (CIO), chief technology officer (CTO), chief 
information security officer (CISO), executive vice president IT/IS, and senior vice 
president IT/IS. If the search yields no results, I relax the search criterion by using more 
general phrases such as “information technology” and “information systems” and I 
carefully read the search results to look for other titles that firms may have assigned to 
their IT executives. If none of the above procedures returns a senior management position 
with an IT-related job title, I deem the firm as having no IT executive. 
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For firms with IT executive positions, I search the proxy statements to document the 
number of years the IT executives have been in their current positions. As pointed out in 
chapter 3, the present study views tenure as a proxy of the IT executive expert power. I 
also document the age of the identified IT executives and whether or not they have an IT-
related background. I capture information about the IT background of IT executives 
because some firms assign the IT executive title to business executives who do not 
necessarily have an IT background or expertise. Next, I carefully examine the list of 
named executive officers (NEO’s) as reported in annual proxy statements, namely in 
form DEF 14A. If the identified IT executive is listed among the firm’s NEOs, I deem the 
executive as a member in the top management team. As pointed out earlier, the current 
research views membership in the TMT as a proxy of the IT executive structural power.  
Executive compensation data comes from the annual proxy statements as well. For 
each firm with an IT executive, I examine the Summary Compensation Table in the DEF 
14A form. If the firm disclosed the IT executive’s compensation information, I document 
that information as well as the compensation information for the TMT.  
All other data (financial data and industry type) are extracted from Audit Analytics. 
4.2 Sample for Study 
The study sample consists of US firms that reported IT control weaknesses under 
Section 404 of SOX from January 2005 to December 2009. The initial sample consists of 
1,712 firm-year observations with internal control weaknesses and 381 firm-year 
observations with at least one IT control weakness. After eliminating foreign firms, the 
sample size drops to 358 firm-year observations with one or more IT-related control 
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weaknesses. In order to study the impact of IT governance and CIO compensations on the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses, a matched pairs approach was used where IT control 
weakness firms were matched with similar firms that reported internal control 
weaknesses but no IT weaknesses. Consistent with the extant literature, this matching 
process was conducted based on industry (4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC) and size 
(revenues at the end of the fiscal year in which the firm reported an internal control 
weakness). If a firm-year observation has no appropriate match based on the 4-digit SIC 
code, then the 3-digit SIC code is used to find a match. If no match is found, the 2-digit 
SIC code is used. If no match is found based on the 2-digit SIC code, the firm-year 
observation is dropped from the sample. The matching process resulted in eliminating 
172 firm-year observations which brought the sample size to 180 firm-year observations 
with at least one IT control weakness. After eliminating firms for which no data was 
available for independent variables (18), the sample size dropped to 162. Thus, the final 
sample consists of 162 firm-year observations with one or more IT-related control 
weaknesses matched with 162 firm-year observations with non-IT weaknesses. These 
two samples are referred to as the “study group” sample and the “control group” sample, 
respectively. Table 2 provides a summary of the sample selection process. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
At the end of the matching process, 40 percent of the firm-year observations in both 
groups were matched based on the 4-digit SIC code, 20 percent on the 3-digit SIC code, 
and 40 percent on the 2-digit SIC code. In order to assess the goodness of the matching 
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procedure and that the study sample is not materially different from the control group, a t-
test was conducted to examine whether the difference in size, measured in terms of total 
revenues, between firms in the two groups is statistically significant. Table 3 provides a 
comparison of the mean revenues between the two groups for each of the fiscal years 
covered as well as for the entire period. Although firms in the study group are smaller, on 
average, than their counterparts in the control group, the t-tests indicate that the 
differences in revenues are not statistically significant for the 5 years suggesting that the 
matching procedure was successful. In addition, Table 3 provides a comparison of the 
two groups in terms of total assets, as another measure of size. The difference in total 
assets between firms in the two groups was not statistically significant providing further 
support for the goodness of the matching procedure. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.3 Measured Variables  
The current study uses three classes of variables: dependent variables, independent 
variables, and control variables. Definitions and measures of these variables are presented 
below. 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The disclosure of IT control weaknesses (ITCW) is the only dependent variable in 
this research. It is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the firm disclosed an IT-
related weakness in its Section 404 report and 0 if the firm is a control firm (i.e. disclosed 
an internal control weakness but not an IT-related weakness).  
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4.3.2 Independent Variables 
4.3.2.1 IT Governance Variables 
The IT background of the corporate governance committee (CORGOVIT) variable 
refers to whether members of the committee previously held CIO positions, whether they 
were IT consultants, or whether they worked as senior managers in IT companies (ex. 
software, programming, database or internet companies). It is an indicator variable that is 
equal to 1 if the corporate governance committee had at least one member with an IT 
background in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year. 
The IT background of the audit committee (AUDITIT) variable refers to whether 
members of the committee previously held CIO positions, whether they were IT 
consultants, or whether they worked as senior managers in IT companies (ex. software, 
programming, database or internet companies). It is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 
if the audit committee had at least one member with an IT background in the year of 
disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year. 
The IT background of the top management team (TMTIT) variable refers to whether 
members of the TMT previously held CIO positions, whether they were IT consultants, 
or whether they worked as senior managers in IT companies (ex. software, programming, 
database or internet companies). It is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the TMT 
had at least one member with an IT background in the year of disclosing an IT control 
weakness and/or the preceding year. 
The CIO structural power (CIOSPWR) variable refers to the CIO formal membership 
in the top management team (TMT). For the purpose of this research, a CIO is considered 
a member of the TMT if the firm listed him/her as one of its named executive officers 
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(NEOs). Therefore, this variable is an indicator variable that is equal to 0 if the firm had a 
CIO who was not a named executive officer and 1 if the CIO was a named executive 
officer in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year. 
The CIO expert power (CIOEPWR) variable refers to the perceived effectiveness of 
the CIO which is measured in terms of how long, in years, the CIO has been in the 
current position.  
4.3.2.2 Executive Compensation Variables 
The CIO compensation (CIOCOMPS) refers to the CIO absolute pay in a given year 
and is based on the sum of the CIO annual salary and bonus. The CIO relative 
compensation (CIOTMTS) refers to the CIO-TMT compensation gap which is derived by 
computing the ratio of the CIO annual salary and bonus (CIOCOMPS) to the average 
annual salary and bonus of the non-IT executive in the TMT. 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
While this research is concerned with firms reporting at least one IT control 
weakness, it is important to note that all firms included in this study have internal control 
weaknesses. Therefore, in addition to the hypothesized relationships, this research 
includes control variables that have been found to impact the disclosure of internal 
control weaknesses, including IT-related weaknesses, and that may impact other study 
variables. 
Evidence from the extant research on internal controls suggests that less profitable 
firms are more likely to disclose internal control weaknesses or have misstated accounts 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005). Firms with lower 
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profitability have fewer resources to allocate towards implementing effective internal 
control systems and/or correcting internal control weaknesses including IT-related 
problems. Therefore, this research includes return on assets (ROA) to control for 
profitability. 
Further research evidence points to a positive association between the disclosure of 
internal control weaknesses and the size of the audit firm. As noted by Ge and McVay 
(2005) “since large audit firms are exposed to a greater legal liability, they might be more 
diligent about searching for, and reporting, material weaknesses” . Therefore, this 
research includes a variable to control for the size of the audit firm (Big4). This variable 
is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the audit firm in the year of disclosing an IT 
control weakness and/or the preceding year was one of the big four and 0 otherwise.  
Another variable that has been shown to have a relationship with two of the study 
variables is firm size. Specifically, evidence from the extant research on internal controls 
suggests that smaller firms are more likely to disclose internal control weaknesses 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005). Furthermore, 
evidence from the extant research on executive compensation suggests that larger firms 
tend to reward their executives with larger compensation packages (Baker and Hall 2004; 
Coles et al. 2001). However, since the present study uses firm size, measured in terms of 
total revenues, to match IT control weakness firms with non-IT control weakness firms, 
this variable will not have any impact on the disclosure of IT control weaknesses and thus 
will not be included as a control variable. 
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In addition to the aforementioned variables, the present study includes a control 
variable to capture the effect of the CIO background (CIOBACK) on the odds of 
disclosing an IT control weakness. The decision to add this variable is because some 
firms assign the IT executive title to business executives who do not necessarily have an 
IT background and expertise. Therefore, this variable is an indicator variable that is equal 
to 1 if the CIO had an IT background in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness 
and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
Table 4 provides functional descriptions of all the variables along with their data 
sources. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.4 Method 
The present study uses logistic regression to investigate and test the relationship 
between the disclosure of IT control weakness and the proposed governance elements. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 ascertain the association between the IT governance elements and the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses. These hypotheses are tested using Model (1) which 
is divided into  two sub models: Model 1a and Model 1b. 
Model 1a tests H1a, H1b, and H1c regarding the relationship between the disclosure 
of IT control weaknesses as a dependent variable and (a) the IT background of the 
corporate governance committee, (b) the IT background of the audit committee, and (c) 
the IT background of the top management team as independent variables, respectively. 
62 
 
The model controls for the client firm profitability and the size of the audit firm. The 
expectation is that the coefficients of β1, β2, and β3 will be negative and significant. 
 
ITCW = β0 + β1 CORGOVITIT + β2 AUDITIT + β3 TMTIT + β4 ROA + β5 BIG4 
Where: 
ITCW = 1 if the firm disclosed an IT-related control weakness in Section 404 report; 
0 otherwise (control firm). 
CORGOVITIT = 1 if the corporate governance committee had IT background in the 
year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year; 0 otherwise. 
AUDITIT = 1 if the audit committee had IT background in the year of disclosing an 
IT control weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
TMTIT = 1 if the top management team had IT background in the year of disclosing 
an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the average of the current 
year’s Total Assets and the prior year’s Total Assets, multiplied by 100. 
BIG4 = 1 if the audit firm in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the 
preceding year is one of the big 4, 0 otherwise. 
 
Model 1b tests H2a and H2b regarding the relationship between the disclosure of IT 
control weaknesses as a dependent variable and (a) the CIO structural power and (b) 
expert power as independent variables, respectively. The model controls for the IT 
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background of the CIO, the client firm profitability and the size of the audit firm. The 
expectation is that the coefficients of β1 and β2 will be negative and significant. 
 
ITCW = β0 + β1 CIOSPWR + β2 CIOEPWR + β3 CIOBACK + β4 ROA + β5 BIG4 
Where: 
CIOSPWR = 1 if the firm had a CIO who was a named executive officer in the year 
of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
CIOEPWR = the number of years the CIO has been in the current position. 
CIOBACK = 1 if the CIO had IT background in the year of disclosing an IT control 
weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the average of the current 
year’s Total Assets and the prior year’s Total Assets, multiplied by 100. 
BIG4 = 1 if the audit firm in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the 
preceding year is one of the big 4, 0 otherwise. 
 
Finally, Model 1c presents results for the full model of Model (1) where ITCW is 
regressed on all IT governance variables and all control variables. The expectation is that 
the coefficients of β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 will be negative and significant. 
 
ITCW = β0 + β1 CORGOVITIT + β2 AUDITIT + β3 TMTIT + β4 CIOSPWR + β5 
CIOEPWR + β6 CIOBACK + β7 ROA + β8 BIG4 
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Where: 
ITCW = 1 if the firm disclosed an IT-related control weakness in Section 404 report; 
0 otherwise (control firm). 
CORGOVITIT = 1 if the corporate governance committee had IT background in the 
year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year; 0 otherwise. 
AUDITIT = 1 if the audit committee had IT background in the year of disclosing an 
IT control weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
TMTIT = 1 if the top management team had IT background in the year of disclosing 
an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
CIOSPWR = 1 if the firm had a CIO who was a named executive officer in the year 
of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
CIOEPWR = the number of years the CIO has been in the current position. 
CIOBACK = 1 if the CIO had IT background in the year of disclosing an IT control 
weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the average of the current 
year’s Total Assets and the prior year’s Total Assets, multiplied by 100. 
BIG4 = 1 if the audit firm in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the 
preceding year is one of the big 4, 0 otherwise. 
 
Hypothesis 3 ascertaining the association between the CIO incentive alignment 
elements and the disclosure of IT control weaknesses is tested using Model (2). More 
specifically, Model 2 tests H3a and H3b about the relationship between the disclosure of 
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IT control weaknesses as a dependent variable and (a) the CIO absolute pay and (b) the 
CIO relative pay as independent variables, respectively. Consistent with extant executive 
compensation literature, the CIO absolute pay variable is a natural log transformation to 
help control for potential scale effects. Finally, the model controls for the IT background 
of the CIO, the client firm profitability and the size of the audit firm. The expectation is 
that the coefficients of β1 and β2 will be negative and significant. 
 
ITCW = β0 + β1 lnCIOCOMPS + β2 CIOTMTS + β3 CIOBACK + β4 ROA + β5 BIG4 
Where: 
lnCIOCOMPS = The natural log of the CIO salary and bonus in the year of disclosing 
IT control weakness and the preceding year. 
CIOTMTS = The ratio of the CIO salary and bonus (CIOCOMPS) to the average 
salary and bonus of the non-IT executive. 
CIOBACK = 1 if the CIO had IT background in the year of disclosing an IT control 
weakness and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
ROA = Income Before Extraordinary Items divided by the average of the current 
year’s Total Assets and the prior year’s Total Assets, multiplied by 100. 
BIG4 = 1 if the audit firm in the year of disclosing an IT control weakness and/or the 
preceding year is one of the big 4, 0 otherwise. 
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Chapter 5 RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 identifies the ITCW firms by industry and weakness year. As shown in the 
table, firms in the study group are spread across 34 industries based on the 2-digit SIC 
code. Interestingly, more than 50% of the firm-year observations in the study group are 
concentrated in only 4 industries (out of 34): Business Services (SIC code 73) with 
23.5%, Electronic and Other Electric Equipment (SIC code 36) with 15.4%, Industrial 
Machinery & Equipment (SIC code 35) with 7.4%, and Communications (SIC code 48) 
with 5.6%. A drill-down of the Business Services industry reveals that approximately 
two-thirds (68%) of the firm-year observations with IT control weakness within this 
industry are computer and data processing companies. Collectively, these ratios lend 
further support to the current body of evidence that companies with higher level of 
computerization are more prone to IT control weaknesses. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Figure 4 provides insights about the trend of reporting IT control weaknesses. More 
specifically, it shows that the number of firm-year observations with IT control 
weaknesses is down trending over the study period. Stated differently, a fewer number of 
firms reported IT control weaknesses in each subsequent year compared to the previous 
year. One explanation could be that firms have acquired and accumulated experience in 
implementing and managing IT controls effectively. For example, the decrease in the 
number of firms with IT control weaknesses was paralleled with an increase in the 
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percentage of firms with a CIO position and an increase in the percentage with CIOs 
amongst their top management teams, as shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4: ITCW Reporting Trend 
Descriptive statistics on the IT governance elements, the CIO incentive alignment 
elements, and the control variables are presented in Table 6. This information is 
presented for both the IT control weakness firms (ITCW) and the non-IT control 
weakness firms (Non-ITCW) and before applying log transformation to the compensation 
data. The mean values for all the variables are greater for the control group firm-year 
observations compared to those of the study group firm-year observations. This suggests 
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that firms with no IT control weaknesses have more IT knowledgeable corporate 
governance and audit committees, more powerful, higher compensated, and more IT 
knowledgeable CIOs, and higher revenues and ROA rates.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 7 provides a comparison of the mean differences between the study group and 
the control group for all the variables included in the analysis. Except for the CIO 
structural power and compensation level, the t-tests indicate that the mean differences are 
statistically significant. The significant differences between the two groups indicate the 
relevance of the study variables. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The correlation matrix for all variables of the study is presented in Table 8. As 
displayed in the table, the disclosure of IT control weaknesses is negatively associated 
with the IT background of the corporate governance committee and the audit committee. 
Furthermore, there is a negative association between reporting IT control weaknesses on 
one hand and the expert power, structural power, compensation level, and IT background 
of the CIO as well as the CIO-TMT pay disparity on the other hand. Finally, the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses is negatively associated with the ROA rates and the 
size of the audit firm. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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A potential issue of concern that could arise in any multivariate analysis is that of 
multicollinearity where two or more predictor variables in a regression model are highly 
correlated. The high correlations, in the presence of multicollinearity, can cause the 
coefficient estimates to be unstable in that they can change drastically in response to 
minor changes in the data or model specifications. In this study, only one pair of 
variables which appear together in a regression model is highly correlated and thus may 
raise concerns about the presence of multicollinearity. These variables are the IT 
background of the corporate governance committee and the IT background of the audit 
committee at 71.3 percent (p-value <.01).  
To assess the potential of multicollinearity between these two variables as well as all 
other variables, multicollinearity diagnostic statistics are computed, namely the Variance 
Inflator Factor (VIF) and Tolerance, for each variable. The VIF measures how much the 
variance of the coefficient of each predictor variable is inflated relative to a situation in 
which all predictor variables are uncorrelated. As shown in Table 8, the highest VIF 
(2.355) corresponded to the IT background of the audit committee and the second highest 
VIF (2.276) corresponded to the IT background of the corporate governance committee. 
However, both values are well below the threshold value of 5 and the higher cut-off value 
of 10 which are suggested to indicate potential multicollinearity concerns. Thus, 
multicollinearity is not expected to pose problems. Nevertheless, the model that contains 
these two variables is examined before and after dropping one of them. In either case, no 
substantial change resulted in the magnitude of the remaining variable’s coefficient. 
Therefore, multicollinearity is not considered to be an issue of concern. 
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5.2 Logistic Regression Model 
This research employs logistic regression to ascertain the relation between 
governance mechanisms and the quality of IT control over financial reporting systems. 
Here, IT control quality is proxied by the presence (absence) of IT control weaknesses in 
the management’s report on the assessment of internal control over financial reporting. 
Two categories of governance and contracting mechanisms are hypothesized to improve 
the quality of IT control through the means of decreasing information asymmetry and 
increasing goal congruence between the board of directors and the top management team 
(TMT) on one hand and the top information systems team (TIST) on the other hand. 
These categories are: IT governance mechanisms and CIO incentive alignment 
mechanisms. 
Two models are constructed to investigate and test the relationship between the odds 
of disclosing an IT control weakness and the elements of each governance mechanism. 
Model (1) estimates the relation between the disclosure of IT control weaknesses and the 
IT governance elements whereas Model (2) estimates the relation between the disclosure 
of IT control weaknesses and the CIO incentive alignment elements. 
5.2.1 Model (1): Effect of IT Governance Mechanisms (H1-H2) 
The IT governance mechanisms include two elements. The first element is the IT 
background element which includes (a) the IT background of the corporate governance 
committee, (b) the IT background of the audit committee, and (c) the IT background of 
the top management team (TMT). The second element is the IT executive element which 
includes (a) the CIO structural power and (b) the CIO expert power. To examine the 
effect of these two elements on the disclosure of IT control weaknesses, two sets of 
71 
 
hypotheses (H1 and H2) were formulated and tested with empirical data using logistic 
regression Model (1). 
Hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c estimate the relation between the disclosure of IT 
control weaknesses on one hand and (a) the IT background of the corporate governance 
committee, (b) the IT background of the audit committee, and (c) the IT background of 
the top management team (TMT) on the other hand, respectively. Drawing on agency 
theory and the notion of information asymmetry, this research expects organizations with 
IT-experienced BODs and TMTs to exhibit lower levels of an IT knowledge gap and thus 
lower levels of information asymmetry. The lower the level of information asymmetry 
between the BOD and the TMT on one hand and the TIST on the other hand, the lower 
the likelihood that the TIST will engage in self-interested behavior. Hence, the lower the 
likelihood of IT-related weaknesses occurring and/or not being fixed in a timely manner. 
Therefore, Hypothesis H1 predicts a negative association between the IT expertise of the 
BOD and the TMT and the disclosure of IT control weaknesses. 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b estimate the relation between the disclosure of IT control 
weaknesses on one hand and (a) the CIO structural power and (b) the CIO expert power 
on the other hand, respectively. The structural power of the CIO is operationalized in 
terms of the CIO formal membership (or lack of it) in the TMT. To this end, a CIO is 
considered a member of the TMT if the firm listed him/her as one of its named executive 
officers (NEOs). The CIO expert power is operationalized in terms of how long, in years, 
the CIO has been in the current position. 
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Evidence from the CIO literature suggests that CIOs with higher levels of structural 
power are more likely to influence other TMT members and gain their support for IT 
initiatives. Further evidence suggests that CIOs with longer tenures (hence, higher expert 
power) are more likely to build stronger relationships with other TMT members and to 
obtain more comprehensive and undisrupted understanding of the organization’s 
information systems. This research expects organizations with higher levels of CIO 
structural power and expert power to exhibit higher levels of goal congruence with the 
BOD and the TMT. The higher the level of alignment, the lower is the likelihood of 
having and subsequently disclosing IT weaknesses. Therefore, Hypothesis H2 predicts a 
negative association between the structural power and the expert power of the CIO and 
the disclosure of IT control weaknesses. 
Table 9 provides coefficients and significance levels for estimating model (1) with the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses (ITCW) as the dependent variable. Model 1a 
displays results of a regression of ITCW on the IT background of the corporate 
governance committee (CORPGOVIT), the IT background of the audit committee 
(AUDITIT), and the IT background of the TMT (TMTIT) as independent variables and 
the client firm profitability (ROA) and the size of the audit firm (BIG4) as control 
variables. Model 1b displays results of a regression of ITCW on the CIO structural power 
(CIOSPWR) and the CIO expert power (CIOEPWR) as independent variables and the 
CIO IT background (CIOBACK) as a control variable. Finally, Model 1c presents results 
for the full model where ITCW is regressed on all IT governance variables and all control 
variables. 
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
As for the independent variables, the statistical results in Model 1c indicate that 
except for the IT background of the TMT, all other IT governance elements were 
significant predictors of the disclosure of IT control weaknesses. More specifically, the 
results indicate that a higher likelihood of disclosing IT-related control weaknesses is 
associated with having no IT expertise among members of the corporate governance and 
the audit committees providing support for H1a and H1b. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that a higher likelihood of disclosing IT control weaknesses is associated with 
having CIOs who are not among their firms’ named-executive officers  (hence, CIOs with 
lower structural power) and who have shorter tenures (hence, CIOs with lower expert 
power) providing support for H2a and H2b.  
With respect to the control variables, the statistical results in Model 1c indicate that a 
higher likelihood of disclosing IT-related control weaknesses is associated with having 
CIOs who do not have an IT background. The results further indicate a negative and 
marginally significant (p-value of .053) association between the likelihood of disclosing 
IT control weaknesses and the size of the audit firm. This finding seemingly contradicts 
Bryan and Lilien (2005) who found the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal 
control (hence, not just IT) to be positively associated with the size of the audit firm. This 
contradiction seems to suggest that firms that are audited by the larger and more diligent 
audit firms (i.e. Big4) are likely to respond to this by implementing more effective IT 
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controls and/or remediating any IT-related control weaknesses than firms audited by 
smaller audit firms. 
Collectively, Model 1c has the highest explanatory power with an R-square of 48%. 
Further, the overall classification accuracy of the model is 82% with 86% of the non-IT 
control weakness firms and 74% of the IT control weakness firms predicted correctly, 
respectively. 
5.2.2 Model (2) Effect of CIO Incentive Alignment Mechanisms (H3) 
Model (2) tests Hypotheses H3a and H3b which estimate the relation between the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses and (a) the CIO absolute pay and (b) the CIO relative 
pay, respectively. For a given firm-year, the CIO absolute compensation is based on the 
sum of CIO annual salary and bonus. The CIO relative pay is derived by computing the 
ratio of the CIO annual salary and bonus to the average annual salary and bonus of the 
non-IT executive in the TMT. 
Drawing on expectancy theory (Vroom 1964), equity theory (Adams 1965) and the 
executive compensation literatures, the present study expects CIOs with higher absolute 
and relative pay to be more committed to organizational objectives and thus to be more 
motivated to design and implement IT controls that are consistent with the organization’s 
internal control objectives. In the event of IT control weaknesses, such CIOs are more 
likely to take the necessary measures to remedy these weaknesses before they are 
reported. Therefore, hypotheses H3a and H3b predict a negative association between the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses and the CIO absolute and relative pay. 
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Table 10 provides coefficients and significance levels for estimating model (2) with 
the disclosure of IT control weaknesses (ITCW) being the dependent variable. The model 
regresses ITCW on the CIO absolute compensation (lnCIOCOMPS) and the CIO relative 
pay (CIOTMTS) and includes three independent variables: CIO IT background 
(CIOBACK), firm profitability (ROA), and size of the audit firm (BIG4). 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Contrary to what is hypothesized, results show that the association between the CIO 
absolute pay and the disclosure of IT control weaknesses is largely insignificant, 
providing no support for H3a.  
As predicted in hypothesis H3b, empirical results show that the CIO relative pay 
(hence, the pay disparity between the CIO and other TMT members) is a significant 
predictor of the disclosure of IT control weaknesses. To this end, the lower the pay 
disparity between the CIO and other business executives in the top management team, the 
lower the likelihood of disclosing IT control weaknesses. This finding is consistent with 
evidence from the executive compensation literature showing that higher pay disparities 
among TMT members trigger feelings of perceived inequity which in turn undermine 
team collaboration and cooperation and increase the likelihood of executives engaging in 
self-interested behavior at the expense of organizational objectives. 
Combined, these findings suggest that it is the level of the CIO relative as opposed to 
absolute compensation that has an impact on IT control quality; a result that is consistent 
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with evidence from the executive compensation literature underscoring the importance of 
relative pay over absolute pay (Bloom 1999).  
Figure 5 presents the final research model with the coefficients and significance 
levels (shown in parentheses) for each of the hypothesized relationships. 
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Figure 5: Theoretical Research Model with Logistic Regression Results 
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Chapter 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
Research on IT control over financial reporting has primarily focused on investigating 
the consequences of IT control weaknesses on the effectiveness of internal control 
structure and the reliability of financial reporting. Despite the evident negative impact of 
IT control weaknesses, there is a paucity in theory-driven research on the antecedents of 
such weaknesses.  
The current work proposes and tests an integrated theoretical model of the 
antecedents of IT control weaknesses. Central to the proposed model is the view that the 
existence of IT control weaknesses is a manifestation of an agency problem caused by 
information asymmetry and lack of alignment between the overall organization 
represented by the board of directors (BOD) as a principal and the information systems 
(IS) organization represented by the top IS team (TIST) as an agent. 
Drawing on agency theory and equity theory, the proposed model postulates that the 
board of directors can employ two categories of governance and contracting mechanisms 
to reduce information asymmetry and align the interests of the TIST with those of the 
organization thereby reducing the agency problem. These categories are: IT governance 
mechanisms and IT executive incentive alignment mechanisms.  
The IT governance mechanisms involve two elements. First, the IT background 
element which includes (a) the IT background of the corporate governance committee, 
(b) the IT background of the audit committee, and (c) the IT background of the top 
management team (TMT). Second, the IT executive element which is viewed in terms of 
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having a CIO position and the structural and the expert power of the CIO. The IT 
executive incentive alignment mechanisms include two elements: (a) the CIO absolute 
pay level and (b) the CIO relative pay as proxied by the pay disparity between the CIO 
and other members of the TMT. 
The current research uses logistic regression to test three sets of hypotheses: H1, H2, 
and H3 corresponding to the IT background element, the CIO power element, and the 
CIO compensation element, respectively. More specifically, the current work tests 
hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c to establish the existence of an association between the 
disclosure of IT control weaknesses on one hand and (a) the IT background of the 
corporate governance committee, (b) the IT background of the audit committee, and (c) 
the IT background of the top management team (TMT), respectively. 
Hypothesis 2 focuses on establishing the existence of an incremental effect that the 
CIO power has on the disclosure of IT control weaknesses beyond the effect of the 
presence of the CIO position. More specifically, the current research tests hypotheses 
H2a and H2b to establish the existence of an association between the disclosure of IT 
control weaknesses on one hand and the CIO structural power and the CIO expert power, 
on the other hand, respectively. 
Hypothesis 3 focuses on whether CIO pay affects the disclosure of IT control 
weaknesses. Specifically, this study tests hypotheses H3a and H3b to establish the 
existence of an association between the disclosure of IT control weaknesses on one hand 
and the CIO absolute pay and the CIO relative pay on the other hand, respectively. 
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In order to test these hypotheses, the present research uses a study sample of 162 
firm-year observations with one or more IT-related control weaknesses for the years 
2005-2009.  Consistent with the extant literature, the study sample was matched with a 
control sample of 162 firm-year observations with non-IT control weaknesses for the 
same period. This matching procedure should provide a baseline for understanding the 
incremental impact of the proposed governance elements on the disclosure of IT control 
weaknesses. 
Support is found for five of the seven hypothesized antecedents of IT control 
weaknesses. As predicted, the IT background of the corporate governance committee and 
the IT background of the audit committee significantly influenced the disclosure of IT 
control weaknesses over financial reporting. To this end, firms with IT knowledgeable 
corporate governance and audit committee members are less likely to disclose IT-related 
control weaknesses. Furthermore, the results provide support for higher levels of CIO 
structural and expert power leading to lower likelihood of disclosing IT-related control 
weaknesses. In addition, results indicate that the lower the pay disparity between the CIO 
and other business executives in the top management team, the lower the likelihood of 
disclosing IT control weaknesses.  
6.2 Limitations 
While the empirical results offer interesting and promising insights into the 
antecedents of IT control weaknesses, the current research has several limitations. One 
such limitation is that it views IT control weaknesses through a dichotomous lens. This 
binary view might be limiting. For example, a company with one or two severe IT control 
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weaknesses would possibly have lower IT control quality than a company with five 
weaknesses that are less severe in nature. Therefore, future research should go beyond 
this dichotomous view of IT control weaknesses to document and classify the specific 
types, severity, and frequency of these weaknesses, followed by an examination of the 
associations between them and the proposed antecedents. 
Another related limitation has to do with the binary nature of many of the 
independent variables that the current study uses. For example, a company having more 
members with IT expertise on its audit committee, corporate governance committee, and 
top management team would possibly have a higher level of IT knowledge (hence, lower 
level of information asymmetry) than a company with fewer IT knowledgeable members. 
Therefore, future research might go beyond this dichotomous view to measure IT 
background as a continuum. For instance, the IT background of the TMT could be 
measured in terms of the percentage of IT knowledgeable executives on the team. 
Finally, due to the secondary nature of the data sources used in the current research, it 
is not possible to measure information asymmetry and goal congruence between the 
board of directors and the top management team on one hand and the top information 
systems team on the other hand. Future research might develop, validate, and incorporate 
measurement scales for these two constructs in order to provide a more robust testing of 
the proposed model. 
6.3 Contribution 
While research provides answers regarding the consequences of IT control 
weaknesses on the quality of internal controls (Bedard and Graham 2011; Canada et al. 
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2009; Grant et al. 2008), the reliability of financial reporting (Klamm and Watson 2009), 
and the accuracy of management earnings forecast (Li et al. 2010), the question of the 
antecedents of IT control weaknesses remains largely unanswered. The only other study 
that investigated the determinants of IT control weaknesses is Li et al. (2007a). Their 
study, however, suffers from three major limitations: (a) lack of theoretical grounding, 
(b) failure to consider other factors, besides IT governance, that may impact IT control 
quality, and (c) use of data from only the first year of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 
compliance. 
This study contributes to the current body of knowledge on IT control weaknesses in 
several ways. First, the present study is the first to propose and test an integrated model 
of the antecedents of IT control weaknesses. The proposed model adds to the current 
literature by introducing (a) agency theory with its notions of information asymmetry and 
goal congruence and (b) equity theory with its notion of perceived equity as a theoretical 
basis of the antecedents of ITCW. Furthermore, the current study adds to the literature on 
the influence of IT governance on the disclosure of IT control weaknesses by introducing 
and examining the impact of the IT background of the corporate governance committee. 
Moreover, this research goes beyond investigating the impact of the presence (absence) 
of the CIO position by providing empirical evidence linking the structural power and the 
expert power of the CIO to the disclosure of IT control weaknesses.  
In addition, the current research contributes to the Information Systems and the 
Accounting Information Systems literatures by introducing and providing empirical 
evidence linking CIO compensation to the disclosure of IT control weaknesses.  
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Lastly, this research contributes to practice by offering a much needed understanding 
for managers, directors, auditors, and regulators in their effort to improve the quality of 
IT control and the reliability of financial reporting. For example, the present study 
contributes to the ongoing public policy debate about the effectiveness of SOX by 
providing evidence that the act has the desired effect of inducing stronger IT control 
systems and better IT governance practices. Specifically, this research provides empirical 
evidence linking the decline in the number of firms with IT control weaknesses over the 
study period to the increase in the percentage of firms with CIO positions and the 
increase in the percentage of firms with CIOs amongst their top management teams. 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement 
H1a 
Companies with corporate governance committee members who don’t have 
IT-related background are more likely to have IT control weaknesses. 
H1b 
Companies with audit committee members who don’t have IT-related 
background are more likely to have IT control weaknesses. 
H1c 
Companies with TMT members who don’t have IT-related background are 
more likely to have IT control weaknesses. 
H2a 
Companies with CIOs with lower level of structural power are more likely 
to have IT control weaknesses. 
H2b 
Companies with CIOs with lower expert power are more likely to have IT 
control weaknesses. 
H3a 
Companies with CIOs with lower absolute pay are more likely to have IT 
control weaknesses. 
H3b 
Companies with CIOs with lower relative pay are more likely to have IT 
control weaknesses. 
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Table 2: Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Steps No. 
Total firm-year observations with internal control weaknesses 1,712 
Less firm-year observations with non-IT related control weaknesses 1,331 
Total firm-year observations with IT control weaknesses 381 
Less foreign firm-year observations with IT control weaknesses 23 
Maximum available firm-year observations with IT control weaknesses  358 
Less firm-year observations for which no match was found 172 
Total firm-year observations with IT control weaknesses for which a 
match is found 
180 
Less firm-year observations with IT control weaknesses for which no 
data is available 
18 
Maximum usable firm-year observations with IT control weaknesses 162 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Table 3: Assessment of the Matching Process Goodness 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
  
NON-
ITCW 
ITCW 
NON-
ITCW 
ITCW 
NON-
ITCW 
ITCW 
NON-
ITCW 
ITCW 
NON-
ITCW 
ITCW 
NON-
ITCW 
ITCW 
REVENUES 
N 50 50 39 39 35 35 27 27 11 11 162 162 
Mean 926 996 1,117 1,027 521 452 497 477 414 305 778 753 
Std. 
Deviation 
1,552 1,946 2,601 2,197 948 785 538 522 485 328 1,629 1,598 
t-statistics -0.199 0.165 0.333 0.141 0.619 0.144 
p-value 0.843 0.870 0.740 0.889 0.543 0.886 
              
ASSETS 
N 50 50 39 39 35 35 27 27 11 11 162 162 
Mean 1,417 948 1,135 1,569 685 1,781 1,563 735 966 585 1,185 1,217 
Std. 
Deviation 
3,057 1,562 2,265 3,052 807 5,857 3,241 1,788 1,186 883 2,465 3,307 
t-statistics 0.967 -0.713 -1.096 1.163 0.855 -0.100 
p-value 0.336 0.478 0.277 0.250 0.403 0.920 
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Table 4: Variable Definitions 
Variable Type Variable Label Variable Description Data Source 
Dependent ITCW 
1 if the firm disclosed an IT-related 
control weakness in Section 404 report; 0 
otherwise (control firm). 
Audit 
Analytics 
Independent CORGOVIT 
1 if the corporate governance committee 
had IT background in the year of 
disclosing an IT control weakness and/or 
the preceding year; 0 otherwise. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Independent AUDITIT 
1 if the audit committee had IT 
background in the year of disclosing an 
IT control weakness and/or the preceding 
year, 0 otherwise. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Independent TMTIT 
1 if the top management team had IT 
background in the year of disclosing an 
IT control weakness and/or the preceding 
year, 0 otherwise. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Independent CIOSPWR 
1 if the firm had a CIO who was a named 
executive officer in the year of disclosing 
an IT control weakness and/or the 
preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Independent CIOEPWR 
The number of years the CIO has been in 
the current position. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Independent lnCIOCOMPS 
The natural log of the CIO salary and 
bonus in the year of disclosing IT control 
weakness and the preceding year. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Independent CIOTMTS 
The ratio of the CIO salary and bonus 
(CIOCOMPS) to the average salary and 
bonus of the non-IT executive. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Control CIOBACK 
1 if the CIO had IT background in the 
year of disclosing an IT control weakness 
and/or the preceding year, 0 otherwise. 
Proxy 
Statements 
Control ROA 
Income Before Extraordinary Items 
divided by the average of the current 
year’s Total Assets and the prior year’s 
Total Assets, multiplied by 100. 
Audit 
Analytics 
Control BIG4 
1 if the audit firm in the year of 
disclosing an IT control weakness and/or 
the preceding year is one of the big 4, 0 
otherwise. 
Audit 
Analytics 
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Table 5: Analysis of ITCW Firms by 2 Digit SIC Code and ITCW Year 
2-Digit 
SIC 
Industry Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
12 Coal Mining  1    1 
13 Oil And Gas Extraction  1 2 1 2 6 
20 Food And Kindred Products 1 2  1  4 
22 Textile Mill Products  1    1 
26 Paper And Allied Products    1  1 
27 Printing And Publishing 1 2 1   4 
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 1 2 1 1  5 
30 Rubber & Misc. Plastics Products 1     1 
33 Primary Metal Industries 1     1 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 4 1 4 3  12 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 6 5 5 5 4 25 
37 Transportation Equipment   1 1  2 
38 Instruments & Related Products  1 3 1 1 6 
39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 1     1 
47 Transportation Services    1  1 
48 Communications 3 2 2 2  9 
49 Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 2 1 2 1  6 
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 3 2  1  6 
51 Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods   1   1 
55 Automotive Dealers & Service Stations 1   1  2 
56 Apparel And Accessory Stores 1     1 
57 Furniture And Home furnishings Stores 1     1 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 2 2 1  1 6 
60 Depository Institutions   1 1 1 3 
61 Non-depository Institutions  2    2 
63 Insurance Carriers   1   1 
65 Insurance Agents, Brokers & Service 1     1 
67 Holding & Other Investment Offices 1 1  2  4 
73 Business Services 13 10 9 4 2 38 
75 Auto Repair, Services, And Parking 1     1 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 1 1    2 
80 Health Services 2  1   3 
82 Educational Services 1 1    2 
87 Engineering & Management Services 1 1    2 
Total  50 39 35 27 11 162 
Percentage  31% 24% 22% 17% 7% 100% 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Group N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CORGOVIT 
 
 
NON-ITCW 162 0 1 0.65 0.48 
ITCW 162 0 1 0.28 0.45 
TOTAL 324 0 1 0.46 0.50 
AUDITIT 
NON-ITCW 162 0 1 0.72 0.45 
ITCW 162 0 1 0.35 0.48 
TOTAL 324 0 1 0.54 0.50 
TMTIT 
NON-ITCW 162 0 1 0.65 0.48 
ITCW 162 0 1 0.38 0.49 
TOTAL 324 0 1 0.52 0.50 
CIO 
NON-ITCW 162 0 1 0.61 0.49 
ITCW 162 0 1 0.27 0.45 
TOTAL 324 0 1 0.44 0.50 
CIOSPWR 
NON-ITCW 99 0 1 0.69 0.47 
ITCW 44 0 1 0.59 0.50 
TOTAL 143 0 1 0.66 0.48 
CIOEPWR 
NON-ITCW 89 0.25 18 5.16 3.66 
ITCW 43 0.75 15 3.82 3.08 
TOTAL 132 0.25 18 4.73 3.53 
CIOBACK 
NON-ITCW 94 0 1 0.98 0.15 
ITCW 43 0 1 0.84 0.37 
TOTAL 137 0 1 0.93 0.25 
CIOCOMPS 
NON-ITCW 82 106 680 304 127 
ITCW 42 107 656 283 113 
TOTAL 124 106 680 297 122 
CIOTMTS 
NON-ITCW 82 0.23 2.29 0.89 0.37 
ITCW 42 0.19 1.25 0.73 0.21 
TOTAL 124 0.19 2.29 0.84 0.33 
BIG4 
NON-ITCW 162 0 1 0.76 0.43 
ITCW 162 0 1 0.58 0.50 
TOTAL 324 0 1 0.67 0.47 
ROA 
NON-ITCW 162 -3.81 0.65 -0.04 0.34 
ITCW 162 -6.96 0.32 -0.14 0.65 
TOTAL 324 -6.96 0.65 -0.09 0.52 
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Table 7: Mean Comparison between the Study Group and the Control Group 
Variable 
Mean 
NON-ITCW        ITCW 
Mean Difference t-statistics p-value 
CORGOVIT 0.65 0.28 0.37 7.178 .000 
AUDITIT 0.72 0.35 0.37 7.178 .000 
TMTIT 0.65 0.38 0.28 5.191 .000 
CIO 0.61 0.27 0.34 6.528 .000 
CIOSPWR 0.69 0.59 0.10 1.113 .268 
CIOEPWR 5.16 3.82 1.34 2.068 .041 
CIOBACK 0.98 0.84 0.14 2.403 .020 
CIOCOMPS 304 283 21 .894 .373 
CIOTMTS 0.89 0.73 0.16 3.167 .002 
ROA -0.04 -0.14 0.10 1.705 .090 
BIG4 0.76 0.58 0.18 3.479 .001 
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix and Collinearity Statistics 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Tolerance VIF 
ITCW 
1           
 
           
CORGOVIT 
-.371** 1          
.439 2.276 
0.000           
AUDITIT 
-.371** .713** 1         
.425 2.355 
0.000 0.000          
TMTIT 
-.278** .529** .536** 1        
.607 1.647 
0.000 0.000 0.000         
CIOSPWR 
-0.093 0.143 0.102 .285** 1       
.881 1.135 
0.268 0.088 0.225 0.001        
CIOEPWR 
-.178* 0.060 0.095 0.090 -0.007 1      
.918 1.089 
0.041 0.498 0.277 0.306 0.940       
CIOBACK 
-.265** .199* 0.133 0.079 -0.052 -0.080 1     
.904 1.107 
0.002 0.020 0.121 0.357 0.543 0.367      
CIOCOMPS 
-0.081 0.084 0.006 0.166 .178* -0.067 0.084 1    
.828 1.208 
0.373 0.352 0.946 0.065 0.048 0.459 0.352     
CIOTMTS 
-.236** 0.052 0.146 0.169 0.123 0.069 0.028 .196* 1   
.759 1.317 
0.008 0.567 0.107 0.060 0.175 0.445 0.754 0.029    
ROA 
-0.095 0.108 0.060 0.032 0.053 0.072 0.076 0.246 -.323* 1  
.770 1.298 
0.089 0.052 0.285 0.565 0.528 0.413 0.377 0.061 0.013   
BIG4 
-.190** .152** .125* 0.081 -0.001 0.119 0.115 0.188 -0.090 .207** 1 
.891 1.123 
0.001 0.006 0.025 0.147 0.993 0.174 0.181 0.155 0.499 0.000  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 9: Model (1) Investigating the Effect of IT Governance Mechanisms on the 
Disclosure of IT Control Weaknesses (H1-H2) 
Model 1a: Investigating the Effect of the IT Background (H1a, H1b, & H1c) 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Estimate Significance 
 
CORGOVIT(1) - -.744 .002 
 
AUDITIT(1) - -.840 .001 
 
TMTIT(1) - -.340 .099 
 
ROA 
 
-.267 .293 
 
BIG4(1) 
 
-.631 .001 
 
% of non-ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
71.60 
% of ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
67.90 
Pseudo R-Squared 
 
0.23 
# of firm-year observations 
 
324 
 
Model 1b: Investigating the Effect of the CIO Power (H2a & H2b) 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Estimate 
Significa
nce  
CIOSPWR(1) - -1.013 .001 
 
CIOEPWR - -.125 .010 
 
CIOBACK(1) - -2.371 .000 
 
ROA 
 
.336 .376 
 
BIG4(1) 
 
-.713 .032 
 
% of non-ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
91.33 
% of ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
33.72 
Pseudo R-Squared 
 
0.21 
# of firm-year observations 
 
259 
 
Model 1c: Investigating the Effect of IT Governance (H1a-H1c & H2a-H2b) 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Estimate Significance 
 
CORGOVIT(1) - -1.724 .001 
 
AUDITIT(1) - -1.211 .011 
 
TMTIT(1) - .206 .614 
 
CIOSPWR(1) - -.908 .017 
 
CIOEPWR - -.118 .045 
 
CIOBACK(1) - -1.863 .006 
 
ROA 
 
.448 .280 
 
BIG4(1) 
 
-.761 .053 
 
% of non-ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
86.13 
% of ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
74.42 
Pseudo R-Squared 
 
0.48 
# of firm-year observations 
 
259 
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Table 10: Model (2) Investigating the Effect of CIO Incentive Alignment 
Mechanisms on the Disclosure of IT Control Weaknesses (H3) 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Estimate Significance 
lnCIOCOMPS - .259 .645 
CIOTMTS - -2.852 .002 
CIOBACK(1) - -2.148 .005 
ROA - -1.155 .370 
BIG4(1) - -1.004 .057 
 
% of non-ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
92.7 
% of ITCW firms predicted correctly 
 
42.9 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.283 
# of firm-year observations 
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